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The Take-Over Bid by Private
Agreement: The Follow-Up
Offer Obligation

1. Introduction
The acquisition of control of a public corporation by the private
purchase of shares from a controlling shareholder' or a control
group has been one of the most controversial issues in corporate and
securities law and has been the subject of a continuing debate. 2 The
purchase of corporate control raises the fundamental issue of the
extent to which a controlling shareholder should be permitted to
dispose of his shares at a premium without sharing the premium
with minority shareholders. Securities law in the United States does
not require equal treatment where control is acquired by private
agreement, 3 but some American jurisprudence holds, as a matter of
*Of Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt, Barristers and Solicitors, Toronto.
1. The reference to the acquisition of control by the purchase of shares implies that
the issue only relates to voting shares. The Ontario follow-up offer obligation does,
in fact, only relate to voting shares. However, under the theory that control is a
corporate asset, or, to a lesser extent, under the theory that the holder of control has
a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders, the sharing of a control premium would
not necessarily be limited to voting shareholders. See section II of this paper.
2. See section II of this paper.
3. See Humes, PrivateSolicitations Under the Williams Act (1981), 66 Cornell L.
Rev: 361. See also Block and Schwarzfeld, Curbing the UnregulatedTender Offer
(1978), 6 Sec. Reg. L.J. 133 and "Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules"
(1979), 18 SEC DOCKET, (No. 17) 1092. The Securities and Exchange
Commission Advisory Committee on Tender Offers (the "SEC Tender Offer
Committee") has considered, inter alia, the issues relating to the regulation of the
acquisition of corporate control. See Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Report
of Recommendations (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington
D.C., July 8, 1983), SEC Release No. 1028 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special
Report (July 15, 1983). The SEC Tender Offer Committee advised in
Recommendation 14 that: "No person may acquire voting securities of an issuer,
if, immediately following such acquisition, such person would own more than 20
percent of the voting power of the outstanding voting securities of that issuer unless
such purchase were made (i) from the issuer, or (ii) pursuant to a tender offer. The
Commission should retain broad exemptive power with respect to this provision."
The SEC Tender Offer Committee did not, however, suggest guidelines for the
exercise of the "broad exemptive power" and did not give reasons for the
suggested prohibition of a stock exchange bid where greater than 20 percent of
voting securities of an offeree were to be acquired.
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corporate law, that majority shareholders who sell effective control
of a corporation at a premium are under a duty to share the premium
with the remaining minority shareholders, essentially on the ground
4
that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the minority.
4. See, for example, Perlman v. Feldmann 219 F.2d 173 (U.S.C.A. 2d Cir.,
1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. 460 P.
2d 464 (Cal. S.C. 1969). But see, for example, Honigman v. Green Giant Co.
309F.2d 667 (U.S.C.A. 8th Cir., 1962), at p.670 (rejection of Berle's theory that
control is a corporate asset). See also, Comment, Shareholders' Liability for Sale
of Controlling Interest (1955), 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 895; Note, (1970), 70 Colum.
L.R. 1079; and Note, (1969), 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1904.
Perlman has been cited as supporting" the view that control is a corporate asset
that belongs to all shareholders. See, for example, Berle, ''Control" in Corporate
Law (1958), 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 at p. 1220. In Perlman, the president,
chairman, and majority shareholder sold effective control of a steel corporation to a
syndicate of steel users which had organized to acquire control of a dependable
source of steel supply. Minority shareholders brought a derivative suit, arguing that
the price paid for the control block included compensation for a corporate asset namely, the power or ability to control the allocation of the corporation's product in
a time of short supply. The court held the sellers liable to the minority shareholders
for that portion of the purchase price attributable to "the appurtenant control over
the corporation's output of steel" (219 F.2d at p. 178). The court further stated (at
p. 178) that it did not mean to:
.. .suggest that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his controlling block
of stock to outsiders without having to account to his corporation for profits or
even never do this with impunity when the buyer is an interested customer,
actual or potential, for the corporation's product. But when the sale necessarily
results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate good will and consequent
unusual profit to the fiduciary who has caused the sacrifice he should account
for his gains. So in a time of market shortage, where a call on a corporation's
product commands an unusually large premium, in one form or another, we
think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropriate for himself the value of
this premium.
Thus, the ratio of Perlman might arguably relate more to a diversion of corporate
opportunities, rather than the sale of control as a corporate asset per se. Leech
comments that ".

. .by

its requirement that defendant show the value of their

shares shorn of the power to allocate steel, the court made it quite clear that the
presence of misappropriated opportunity was the essential element in determining
their liability." See Leech, Transactionsin Corporate Control (1956), 104 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 725 at p.815.
In Jones, a successful minority shareholders' action was brought against a
former holding company which had sold control. Traynor C.J. stated at p.471 that:
• . .majority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a
joint purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the
corporation to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just, and
equitable manner. Majority shareholders may not use their power to control
corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the
minority. Any use to which they put the corporation or their power to control the
corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately. . ..
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Notwithstanding some Canadian judicial recognition of a fiduciary
duty of the majority to the minority shareholders where corporate
control is sold, 5 there has not been a parallel development in
Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence where it has generally been assumed
5. See Farnham v. Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132 (C.A.), (1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d)
156; revg., on other grounds, [1972] 30.R. 688 (H.C.J.), (1972), 29 D.L R. (3d)
279, (recognition, as a legitimate cause of action, of a suit predicated on the
existence of a fiduciary obligation owed to all shareholders by a control group in
the sale of their controlling shares at a premium in an interlocutory proceeding
settled before trial; the issue before the C.A. dealt simply with whether there was a
proper class action). See also Re R.J. Jowsey Mining Co. Ltd., [1969] 2 O.R. 549
(C.A.), (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 97, (per Laskin J.A., as he then was, in a dictum at
O.R., pp. 556-557, stating that "...the taking of control of a public company
itself lays a burden of fair dealing on the person or group who secures it, beyond
any duty that devolves upon them as directors in the day to day operations of the
company"); Re ConsolidatedManitoba Mines Ltd., [December 1966] O.S.C.B. 5,
(per the then Chairman, J.R. Kimber, and Commissioners J.H. McFarland and
John Willis observing that the question of sharing a control premium was a matter
of corporate law, but intervening to refuse to allow a transfer of shares within
escrow where the transfer would pass control to purchasers without a take-over bid
being made for the minority shares, stating at p. 10 that "[a]s to a shareholder's
right to equal opportunity, the Ontario law may not be settled on this question but it
is recognized as good corporate practice to provide this .

. .

. Indeed it is just

because the law is not clear that the Commission feels impelled . . . to extend its
protection to the shareholders .

. .

. in so doing the Commission is trying to carry

out the spirit of the law.")
Consolidated Manitoba Mines was referred to in Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal.

Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1st Dist., 1969) (breach of fiduciary duty established where
sale of only controlling shareholder's shares to purchaser offering to buy assets of
corporation or all shares). After ConsolidatedManitoba Mines, the OSC attempted
to require that purchasers of control shares held in escrow make an offer to all other
shareholders. See "Proposed Policy Change: Consents to Transfer Within
Escrow", [May 1967] 1 O.S.C.B. 1 at pp. 1-2:
Since [the ConsolidatedManitobaMines decision] The Securities Act, 1966 has
been proclaimed and is now fully in force. On considering requests for transfers
within the escrow of numbers of shares of mining companies issued for
properties which are sufficiently large to materially affect control, the
Commons concluded that it would be inequitable to permit the sale and transfer
of those shares unless a similar offer is made to all the shareholders of the
offeree company. The Commission is of the view that where an offer to
purchase is made to the holders of escrowed shares a similar offer should be
made to all shareholders following the standards of disclosure and the
conditions laid down for take-over bids by Part IX of The Securities Act, 1966.
Later, the OSC stated that transfers in escrow would be approved if it could be
demonstrated that they were, inter alia, "of benefit to all shareholders generally."
See "Re: Transfers Within Escrow", [1967] 2 O.S.C.B. 72. See also Re Terra
Riche Mines Limited, [1967] 2 O.S.C.B. 73. The OSC did not, however, extend its
escrow share policy to other transactions. See, for example, Re Wainoco Oil and
Chemicals Limited, [1967] 2 O.S.C.B. 97. See generally, Gibson, The Sale of
Control in CanadianCompany Law (1975), 10 U.B.C, Law Rev. 1 at p. 12, n.34.
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that majority shareholders and directors will not breach a fiduciary
duty toward minority shareholders simply because they have either
sold or sanctioned the sale of a controlling block of shares at a
6
premium not available to the other shareholders.
After considerable debate in Ontario, the question of an equal
opportunity for minority shareholders to share in a premium paid for
control was addressed in The Securities Act, 1978, which enacted a
shareholder equal opportunity law, commonly referred to as the
"follow-up offer obligation". 7 In general terms, the act requires
that a purchaser who acquires publicly traded voting shares of a
public corporation in a private agreement transaction which would
normally be regulated by the act as a take-over bid and who pays a
price exceeding fifteen percent of the trading price must make a
follow-up offer of equivalent value to the remaining shareholders. 8
Manitoba has adopted the follow-up offer obligation in its securities

6. Gower, L.C.B., Cronin, J.B., Easson, A.J., and Lord Wedderbum of
Charlton, Gower's Principlesof Modern Company Law (4th ed., London: Stevens
& Sons, 1979) p. 707. Gower's does, however, state at p. 640 that "[w]e may,
indeed, be approaching the view taken by a number of American courts, that
members who sell shares which confer effective control of the company and, in
consequence, command a higher price are under a duty to share the excess price
with the other shareholders". See also, lacobucci, Frank, Pilkington, Marilyn L.,
and Prichard, J. Robert S., CanadianBusiness Corporations (Agincourt: Canada
Law Book Limited, 1977) pp. 445-466; Beck, Stanley M., Getz, Leon, lacobucci,
Frank, and Johnston, David L., Business Associations Casebook (Toronto: Richard
De Boo Limited, 1979) pp.356-391; Short v. Treasury Commissioners, [1948]
A.C. 534 (H.L.), per a dictum of Lord Uthwatt at p.546: ". . if some one
shareholder held a number of shares sufficient to carry control of the company, it
might well be that the value proper [sic] to be attributed to his holding. . . was
greater than the sum of values that would be attributed to the shares comprised in
that holding if they were split between various persons. The reason is that he has
something to sell - control - which the others considered separately have not."
7. The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c.47, as am. by S.O. 1979, c.86 (in force
on September 15, 1979), now the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.466 (hereinafter
referred to as the "act"). The regulation under the act (hereinafter referred to as the
"regulation") is R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 910, as am. by O.Reg. 84/81, O.Reg.
224/81, O.Reg. 238/81, O.Reg. 637/82, O.Reg. 649/82, O.Reg. 808/82, and 0.
Reg. 180/83.
8. See section III of this paper.
See generally, Alboini, Victor P., Ontario Securities Law (Toronto: Richard De
Boo Limited, 1980) pp. 716-732; Anisman, Philip, Takeover Bid Legislation in
Canada: A Comparative Analysis (Don Mills: CCH Canadian Limited, 1974) pp.
37-44; Johnston, David L., Canadian Securities Regulation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) pp.324, 340-341, and Johnston, D.L., Buckley, F.H., Dey, P.J.,
and Drinkwater, D.W., Canadian Securities Regulation Supplement 1982
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) pp. 4 6 and 53.
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legislation, which has not yet been proclaimed in force, 9 and British
Columbia's draft proposals for new securities legislation include the
follow-up offer obligation. 10 In Quebec, the new Securities Act
removes the private agreement exemption where the offeror pays in
excess of a fifteen percent premium over the market price, requiring
all bids at an amount above the premium to be made pro rata. 11 The
follow-up offer obligation was not included in Alberta's revised
securities legislation 12 and the Canada Business Corporations Act
does not include a follow-up offer obligation. '3 The draft proposals
9. The Securities Act, 1980, S.M. 1980, c.50, subs. 91(1).
10. A ProposedNew Securities Act and Draft Regulations (Ministry of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs, British Columbia, July 1982) Draft Reg., s. 137.
11. Securities Act, S.Q. 1982, c.48, s. 116 and Q.Reg. 83-660, s. 187.
12. Securities Act, 1981, S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1, as am. by S.A. 1982, c.32.
13. Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75, c.33, as amended
(hereinafter referred to as the "CBCA"). There may be a question as to whether
the Parliament of Canada has the constitutional authority to enact a follow-up offer
obligation in the CBCA. Since the provisions in the CBCA relating to take-over
bids are only operative when the target corporation is a CBCA corporation, we
believe that such an amendment to the CBCA would be intra vires the Parliament of
Canada.
Section 92(11) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly the B.N.A. Act) confers
on the provincial legislatures the power to make laws in relation to "the
incorporation of companies with provincial objects". Although a corresponding
power is not included in the enumeration of federal powers contained in s.91 of the
act, the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament in relation to the incorporation of
companies with other than provincial objects has long been recognized by Canadian
courts. The nature and extent of this jurisdiction, which has often been the subject
of considerable controversy in the courts, was recently considered by Dickson J. in
Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon (1982), 44 N.R. 181 (S.C.C.), where,
speaking on behalf of the court, he stated, at p. 197, that:
It has been well established ever since John Deere Plow Company Ltd. v.
Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.), that the power of legislating with reference
to the incorporation of companies with other than provincial objects belonged
exclusively to the Dominion Parliament as a matter covered by the expression
"the peace, order and good government of Canada". Additionally, the power to
regulate trade and commerce, at all events, enabled the Parliament of Canada to
prescribe to what extent the powers of companies the objects of which extended
to the entire Dominion should be exercisable and what limitations should be
placed on such powers. Viscount Haldane, L.C., delivering the judgment of
their Lordships, stated further (at p.340) that ". . .if it be established that the
Dominion Parliament can create such companies, then it becomes a question of
general interest throughout the Dominion in what fashion they should be
permitted to trade".
The power of Parliament in relation to the incorporation of companies with
other than provincial objects has not been narrowly defined. The authorities are
clear that it goes well beyond mere incorporation. It extends to such matters as
the maintenance of the company, the protection of creditors of the company and
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for a federal securities market law did not include a follow-up offer
obligation, and the issue was left "for reconsideration in light of the
the safeguarding of the interests of the shareholders. It is all part of the internal
ordering as distinguished from the commercial activities . . .As Professor
Hogg has said in his book [Constitutional Law of Canada (1977)] at p.351:
"The federal power to incorporate companies . . . is simply the residue of the
entire possible power to incorporate companies after subtracting the provincial
power" and ".

. .it

also authorizes all laws of a company law character, for

example, the laws pertaining to corporate powers, organization, internal
management and financing" (at p. 353).
The issue to be considered, therefore, is whether the proposed amendments would
fall within this federal "company law" power. The leading case on point is Esso
Standard(Inter-America) Inc. v. J.W. EnterprisesInc., [1963] S.C.R. 144, where
the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to consider the constitutional validity of
the provisions of The Companies Act, 1952, R.S.C. 1952, c. 53 s. 128 (the
corresponding provision in the CBCA is subs. 199(3)), respecting the compulsory
acquisition of minority shares in take-over bids. Judson J., speaking on behalf of
the court, stated, at 152-153, that:
There has been complete unanimity throughout [the course of the litigation] that
Parliament has the power to enact section 128. The matter was summarized by
Laidlaw J.A. [speaking on behalf of the Ontario Court of Appeal] as follows:
"It is my opinion that the Parliament of Canada having legislative power to
create companies whose objects extend to more than one Province possesses
also the legislative power to prescribe the manner in which shares of the capital
of such companies can be transferred and acquired. That matter is one of general
interest throughout the Dominion." It is truly legislation in relation to the
incorporation of companies with other than provincial objects and it is not
legislation in relation to property and civil rights in the province or in relation to
any matter coming within the classes of subject assigned exclusively to the
legislature of the province. It deals with certain conditions under which a person
may become a shareholder or lose his position as a shareholder in such a
company and, in my opinion, this case is completely covered by the reasons of
this Court in Reference re Constitutional Validity of s. 110 of the Dominion
Companies Act, [1934] S.C.R. 653.
The Reference case referred to by Judson J. concerned the constitutional
competence of Parliament to enact legislation imposing personal liability on
directors where payment of a dividend rendered the company insolvent or impaired
its capital. Duff C.J.C., speaking on behalf of the court in that case, recognized the
right of the federal Parliament to provide, inter alia, for the constitution of
companies it created and for the conditions under which membership could be
acquired. See also Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204.
In view of the close analogy that may be drawn between the nature of the
provisions considered by the court in the Esso case, supra, and the follow-up offer
obligation here under consideration, it is our view that the approach taken by
Judson J.in the Esso case would be applicable and that an amendment creating a
follow-up offer obligation would be found to be intra vires the Parliament of
Canada. A further issue concerns the effect that the enactment of such an
amendment would have on the operation of similar provisions now contained in
relevant provincial statutes, for example, the Securities Act (Ontario). Assuming
that the provincial legislation now in effect were held to be intra vires the province
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experience under the Ontario legislation and the comments received
on these Proposals".14
It is an appropriate time to consider the Ontario experience,
because the follow-up offer obligation has been controversial' 5 and
is being reconsidered by the Ontario Securities Commission 16 and
the securities industry. 17 The purpose of this paper is to examine the
Ontario experience with the follow-up offer obligation, analyze the
administrative and judicial decisions interpreting its provisions, and
offer some suggestions for reform.
In order to provide a framework within which the follow-up offer
obligation can be adequately considered, this paper commences in
Part II with a discussion of the theoretical debate concerning the
sale-of-control problem, and then describes, in Part III, the
historical background to the legislative implementation of the
follow-up offer in Ontario. After setting out the framework of the

as a matter of property and civil rights, would these provisions be suspended and
rendered inoperative in respect of corporations incorporated under the laws of
Canada? A similar issue was recently considered by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Multiple Access case, supra. The majority of the court in that case held that
the mere duplication of enactments at the federal and provincial levels without
actual conflict or contradiction between them would not be sufficient to render
otherwise valid provincial legislation inoperative. Dickson J. stated, at p. 209, that:
"In principle, there would seem to be no reason to speak of paramountcy and
preclusion except if there is actual conflict in operation as where one enactment
says 'yes' and the other says 'no'; 'the same citizens are being told to do
inconsistent things'; compliance with one is defiance of the other. The courts are
well able to prevent double recovery in the theoretical and unlikely event of
plaintiffs trying to obtain relief under both sets of provisions." Accordingly,
should a follow-up offer obligation in the CBCA merely duplicate existing
provincial legislation, the provincial legislation would remain operative,
duplication now being considered to be "the ultimate in harmony" (at p. 208).
Should compliance with one set of provisions result in breach of the other,
however, the otherwise valid provincial legislation would be rendered inoperative.
14. Anisman, Philip, Grover, Warren M.H., Howard, John L., and Williamson,
J. Peter, 2 Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law for Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, 1979), p. 124.
15. See, for example, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 21, 1982 at p. Bll, col. 4 and
Dec. 30, 1982 at p.6, col. 1.
16. Interim Report of the Committee to Review the Provisions of the Act
Regulating Take-Over Bids (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 213A (hereinafter referred to as the
"Interim Take-Over Bid Review Report" of the "Review Committee"). The
Ontario Securities Commission is herein referred to as the "OSC" or the
"commission".
17. The Regulation of Take-over Bids in Canada, Recommendationsfor a Uniform
CanadianFramework (ProgressReport), (Joint Industry Committee, Pierre Lortie,
Chairman, March 30, 1983).
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act with respect to the follow-up offer in Part IV, we analyze the
administrative and judicial interpretation of the act in Part V. We
offer some suggestions for reform in Part VI.
II. The TheoreticalDebate
Some commentators argue that corporate shares are a form of
personal property which should be freely transferable at whatever
price the seller can obtain, even if the consideration involves a
premium paid for the sale of a controlling block of shares. 18 On the
other hand, others have argued that a premium paid for the purchase
of corporate control should be shared equally amongst all
shareholders of a corporation.1 9 The views of the latter group of
commentators can be generally categorized under the corporate
asset or the fiduciary duty theories, or the equal opportunity rule.
(a) The CorporateAsset Theory
In 1932, Berle and Means formulated the corporate asset theory of
corporate control, arguing that: ". . .the power going with
"control" is an asset which belongs only to the corporation;
• . •payment for that power, if it goes anywhere, must go into the
corporate treasury . . . "control" is a valuable piece of property
to its holder, and so regarded; its value arises out of the ability
which the holder has to dominate property which in equity belongs
to others." 2 0 Berle later elaborated on the theory, saying that:
The position of a majority shareholder, with his capacity to
control, is . . not a "property right" in the same sense as is his
right to participate in dividends, or in liquidation or the like. His
control power is really adventitious, a by-product of the corporate
capacity to choose a board of directors by less than unanimity.
This is why the control power - capacity to choose
a
management - is a corporate asset, not an individual one. 2 1

18. See, for example, Posner, infra, note 33.
19. See generally, O'Neal, F. Hodge, "Squeeze-outs" of Minority Shareholders
(Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1975) c. 4, s. 405 at p. 198; O'Neal, Sale of a
Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability (1976), 38 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 9.
20. Berle, A.A., and Means, G.C., The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) pp. 216-217.
21. Berle, The Priceof Power: Sale of CorporateControl (1965), 50 Cornell L.Q.
628 at p. 638.
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Berle defines control as "the capacity to choose directors", and
states that "[a]s a corollary, it carries capacity to influence the
board of directors and possibly to dominate it", 2 2 so that "[tihe
holder of control is not so much the owner of a proprietary right as
the occupier of a power-position". 2 3 Berle's analysis of the
corporate control position, in light of the then emergent American
jurisprudence, led him to argue that premiums paid for corporate
control should be shared equally:
[Some] decisions dealing with the control function relate to
benefits derived from its sale. These decisions point to a slowly
emerging rule (by no means universally acknowledged) that,
where stockholdings carrying controls [sic] are sold, any
identifiable portion of the consideration paid for the powerposition over and above the value of the stock ex the
control-power element belongs not to the control-seller 2but
4 to the
corporation or (perhaps) to all the shareholders rateably.
(b) The Fiduciary Duty Theory
The formulation of the sale-of-control problem, in terms of the
corporate asset theory, also led Berle and Means to postulate a
25
theory of the exercise of corporate powers in terms of trust.
Bayne, taking Berle and Means' work as his starting point in an
analysis of the corporate control premium issue, argues that
majority shareholders are subject to equitable controls, rendering
them analogous to trustees: "The relation persisting between the
office of corporate control and the corporation and its shareholders
is in all essentials verified in the relationship between the office of
trustee and the beneficiaries. With only accidental qualifications,
therefore, corporate control is a strict trustee." '2 6 Under this
22. Berle, "'Control" in Corporate Law (1958), 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 at p.
1212. See also Note, The Sale of CorporateControl: The Berle Theory and the Law

(1963), 25 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 59.
23. Berle, supra, note 22 at p. 1215.
24. Ibid, at p. 1220.

25. Supra, note 20 at p. 219.
26. Bayne, CorporateControl as a Strict Trustee (1965), 53 Geo. L.J. 543 at pp.
549-550. See also Bayne, A Philosophy of CorporateControl (1963), 112 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 22; Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy

(1969), 47 Tex. L. Rev. 215; Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandry (1965), 51
Cornell L.Q. 49; Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control (1965), 9 St. Louis
U.L.J. 445; Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control (1965), 33 Fordham L. Rev.

583; Bayne, The Sale-Of-Control Premium: the Definition (1969), 53 Minn. L.
Rev. 485; Bayne, The Sale-Of-ControlPremium: the Disposition (1969), 57 Calif.
L.

Rev.

615; Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The

Weyenberg
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analysis, by virtue of the majority shareholders' ability to dominate
the affairs of the corporation through the election of directors and
their consequent direction over management and assets of the
corporation which belong to all shareholders, the majority
shareholder is placed in a custodial relationship vis-i-vis the
minority, and has a fiduciary duty of loyalty to ensure that the
27
minority is treated equally when corporate control is sold
Brudney states that the issue is whether there is a duty of loyalty
in addition to a mere duty of care, since a duty of care would only
make a seller of control accountable where he failed to exercise
appropriate care in selling to a purchaser whom he knew or should
have known would be likely to unlawfully exploit the acquired
position of control. 28 Brudney is in favour of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty in a control situation, which, he argues, should not be
diluted for other corporate considerations:
[The consequences of a transfer of control], even without regard
to the problem of private exploitation, are not likely to be
beneficial to the other investors in the enterprise unless the
purchasing group offers executive and managerial qualities which
are superior to those offered by the selling group. But the selling
group is under no duty to find or even to seek such a buyer.
Hence, even apart from whether the premium should be shared
on the theory that the "asset" for which it is being paid is an
asset belonging to the corporation or to all stockholders rather
than just to the sellers, it is difficult to see why rigorous fiduciary
standards should be diluted when such a dilution may expose
29
public investors to the risks connected with sales at a premium.

Shoe-Florsheim Case Stud)' (1966),

18 Stan. L. Rev.

438; Bayne, The

Noninvestment Value of ControlStock (1970), 45 Ind. L.J. 317.
27. Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, supra, note 26 at p. 565. See
also Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control (1956), 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1, who
states, at p. 31, that: "[Where the majority shareholder sells his shares at a

premium above investment value, he]. . .exploits corporate powers - powers
which he holds in trust for the corporation and the other shareholders". But cf
Note, FiduciaryDuties of Majority or ControllingStockholders (1959), 44 Iowa L.

Rev. 734, arguing that the majority or controlling shareholder should only have a
fiduciary duty to inquire as to the possible effect the sale will have on the

corporation and the remaining shareholders and that the duty should go further.
28. Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control

(1966), 65 Mich. L. Rev. 259 at pp. 296-297.
29. lbid, pp. 298-299.
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(c) The Equal Opportunity Rule
Andrews rejected the corporate asset theory due to iis "operative
difficulties", 3 0 and instead proposed a prophylactic rule of equal
opportunity, as follows:
[W]henever a controlling stockholder sells his shares, every other
holder of shares (of the same class) is entitled to have an equal
opportunity to sell his shares, or a prorata part of them, on
substantially the same terms. Or in terms of the corollative duty:
before a controlling stockholder may sell his shares to an outsider
he must assure his fellow stockholders an equal opportunity to
sell their shares, 3or as high a proportion of theirs as he ultimately
sells of his own. '
Andrews argues first that his proposed rule will prevent sales of
control that might cause a loss to the corporation, and second, that
all shareholders should have an equal opportunity to share in the
32
profits arising by virtue of the sale of shares.
(d) Arguments Against Sharing Control Premiums
On the other hand, some commentators argue that there has been a
misguided emphasis on corporate democracy by those arguing in
favour of equal sharing of control premiums. These commentators
believe that economic efficiency will be facilitated if there are no
impediments to corporate control transactions. Posner states that:
There would be another obstacle if proposals were adopted that
would forbid a controlling shareholder, in selling his shares, to
charge a premium for the control of the corporation that the sale
bestows on the buyer. The underlying theory is that the
30. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares

(1965), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505 at p. 513. For example, if the premium for control
were paid to the corporation, the purchaser of control would have the benefit of the

premium as the new corporate controller. Thus, notwithstanding that the suit in
Perlman was made on behalf of the corporation as a derivative action, the premium
was directed to be paid to the minority to preclude the purchaser of control from
benefitting by having the premium paid into the corporate treasury. See Perlman,
supra, note 4 at p. 178.

31. Andrews, supra, note 30 at pp. 515-516.
32. For the first argument, see Andrews, supra, note 30 at pp. 517-21; for the

second argument, see, ibid, at pp. 521-22. Jennings concurs and argues that "a sale
of control shares should be accompanied by a general offer". See Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control (1965), 44 Calif. L. Rev. I at p. 39. See also,
Leech, Transactionsin CorporateControl (1956), 104 U.Pa. L. Rev. 725; stating,
at p. 837, that a "broad rule of accountability in all control sale cases. . .has

merit".
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controlling shareholder has fiduciary obligations to the minority
shareholders. The theory has merit in the special cases.

. .where

there is a conflict of interest between majority and minority
shareholders. But in the usual take-over situation the latter will be
more injured than benefited by a rule that, by reducing the
controlling shareholder's incentive to sell his control, retards the
reallocation of the assets of the corporation to people who can use
them more productively to the benefit of all of the shareholders. 3 3
Easterbrook and Fischel share Posner's assumption that all sales
of control are beneficial to the remaining shareholders, and argue
that a majority shareholder should be able to sell his shares at a
substantial premium without any obligation to share that premium
with other shareholders. "The premium price received by the seller
of the control bloc amounts to an unequal distribution of the
gains. .

.

.this unequal distribution reduces the costs to purchasers

of control, thereby increasing the number of beneficial control
transfers and increasing the incentive for inefficient controllers to
relinquish their positions." 3 4 Easterbrook and Fischel specifically
reject the corporate asset theory and the equal opportunity rule
advocated by Andrews and Jennings, as follows: "Both of these
proposed treatments of the control premium would stifle transfers of
control . .

.

.Minority shareholders would suffer under either rule,

as the likelihood of improvements in the quality of management

33. Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law (2d. ed. Boston and Toronto:

Little, Brown and Company, 1977) p. 304.
34. Easterbrook and Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions (1982), 91 Yale
L.J. 698 at p. 716. See also, Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market
for CorporateControl, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers (1978), 57 Tex.
L. Rev. 1; Easterbrook and Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer (1981), 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (arguing that

resistance by a corporation's managers to premium tender offers ultimately
decreases shareholder welfare); Easterbrook and Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare (1981), 36 Bus. Law. 1733. Other

commentators have argued that rules of equal opportunity would be harmful, as
they would inhibit beneficial transactions. See, for example, Javaras, Equal
Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews

(1965), 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420, stating, at p. 425, that "... the gravest defect in
Professor Andrew's theory is a grievous underassessment of the costs of a
preventative rule in restraining beneficial transactions"; Comment, Sales of
Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill (1965),

31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 725,

stating, at p. 751, that: "The reluctance of the judiciary to impose a general rule of
liability on sellers of controlling shares is basically sound. There is a strong
possibility that a significantly large number of economically beneficial sales of
control would be blocked by a rule that the seller is liable in all cases."
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declined." 3 5 They propose only one qualification: the controller
should be allowed to keep his gain, subject only to the "constraint
that the other parties to the transaction be at least as well off as
36
before the transaction."
Hill is likewise against a blanket rule of equal opportunity and
suggests that "progress in this difficult area is more likely to be
achieved if the attention of the courts is focused on demonstrable
evils and on solutions aimed specifically at such evils". 3 7 Hill
argues that the courts should only become involved where there is a
clear detriment to the minority shareholders by the sale of control,
such as where control is sold to persons whom the seller has reason
to believe will loot or otherwise harm the corporation, and that to
insist that a uniform offer be made to all shareholders when control
is sold "might well result in economic dislocations, with adverse
effects outweighing any possible benefits, even from the point of
view of the noncontrolling shareholders sought to be protected.' '38
The analysis by commentators arguing that there should be no
requirement for an equal opportunity for minority shareholders to
sell shares where control is sold is predicated on the assumption that
sales of control will ultimately benefit all shareholders in particular,
and the economy in general, by, among other things, facilitating the
infusion of better management into moribund corporations. A
requirement for a pro rata offer to all shareholders would, they
argue, likely preclude some beneficial transactions from taking
place. As Easterbrook and Fischel put it:
The sale of a control block of stock, for example, allows the
buyer to install his own management team, producing the same
gains available from a tender offer for a majority of shares but at
a lower cost to the buyer. Because such a buyer believes he can
manage the assets of a firm more profitably, he is willing to pay a
premium over the market price to acquire control. The premium
will be some percentage of the anticipated increase in value once

35. Corporate Control Transactions, supra, note 34 at p. 716.

36. lbid, at p.

698. See also Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control (1976), 38 Chi.

B. Rec. 376; Comment, Sale of Corporate Control (1952),

19 U. Chi. L. Rev.

869.
37. Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares (1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 at p. 988.

38. lbid, at p. 1039. See also Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Premium:
an Analysis and Suggested Approach, [1961] Duke L.J. 554 (utilizing fiduciary

concept in cases of fraud and negligence, but any further imposition of liability on
seller of corporate control is unwarranted and unsound).
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the transfer of control is effectuated . .

.

.There is a strong

presumption, therefore, that free transferability of corporate
control, like any other3 9type of voluntary exchange, moves assets
to higher valued uses.
Some commentators argue that this assumption ignores the fact
that many take-overs occur not because the target corporation is
badly operated, but because it is an efficient and well-run
corporation which may be undervalued due to prevailing economic
conditions, and not due to poor management. 40 We would also add,
based upon our own experience, that it is hard to justify some
take-overs on economic grounds. Some take-overs have been the
civilized equivalent of war in the private sector and gamesmanship
and power has been the motivating factor. Furthermore, as Leech
argues, economic evidence has not been provided to show that a
requirement of a sharing of the control premium will unduly impede
the take-over bid technique:
That the economics of control sales has traditionally resulted in a
private benefit accruing to holders of control does not prove that
the results should be encouraged. A balance of the interests of all
shareholders is involved; only when that balance has been
established may it be stated what the controlling shareholder's
property rights are and what they are not. It may be further
objected that a requirement of accounting for premium prices
received from a sale of control may serve to stagnate corporate
ownership, that there are greater risks from restraining sales of
controlling shares than from permitting new blood to enter the
corporation by purchase of control. Insistence on an even-handed
offer to all shareholders may block some control transfers; it will
not block all of them. Further, it is still to be shown that there is
inherent virtue in protecting a system whereby one block of
shareholders4 1largely unresponsive to their fellows is supplanted
by another.

39. CorporateControl Transactions, supra, note 34 at p. 705.
40. See, for example, Block and Schwarzfeld, supra, note 3 at p. 135.
41. Leech, supra, note 32 at p. 838. See also Andrews, supra, note 30 - he
states, at p. 519, that ". . .1 do not believe the rule of equal opportunity would
have much tendency to discourage beneficial transactions. After all, if the
purchaser is optimistic - and can convince his bankers to share his optimism - he
should be willing to buy out everyone"; Brudney, supra, note 28, states, at p. 299,
that: "Certainly before diluting [fiduciary standards] as substantially as has been
suggested, some imperative need for allowing a controlling stockholder to sell at a
premium should be shown, or some empirical evidence should be offered to
establish that controlling groups are likely to sell out more readily to economically
desirable purchasers if they are permitted to receive a premium, or that there is
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(e) A Synthesis: FiduciaryDuty and Equal Opportunity
An analysis of the theoretical bases giving rise to a fiduciary
obligation demonstrates that the fiduciary concept could be
applicable where the majority shareholder sells control without an
equal opportunity being extended to the minority shareholders to
sell their shares. The theory of unjustifiable enrichment holds that a
fiduciary relationship exists where one person obtains property or
other advantage which justice requires should belong to another
person. 4 2 The unequal relationship theory focuses on the inequality
of footing of the parties, providing generally that a fiduciary
obligation arises where the stronger party takes action which affects
the property rights of the weaker party. 4 3 Majority and minority
shareholders are on unequal footing because the majority
shareholders are in a position to sell control which affects the
property rights of the minority. Control can be viewed as a
corporate asset which, like other corporate assets, should be shared
equally when it is sold. 44 When the majority shareholder sells
control without sharing the premium with, or ensuring that an equal
offer be made to, the minority, then the minority is left in an
unequal position: the minority shareholder can stay with new
management he has not chosen, or he can sell his shares at a price
which will likely be substantially lower than that obtained by the
majority seller. 45 In these circumstances, social goals of fairness
and justice might arguably require that equality be ensured.
Furthermore, the fiduciary concept accords with the commercial
utility theory, 4 6 which holds that the fiduciary obligation performs
47
the "function of maintaining the integrity of the marketplace."
some over-all social or economic need so to encourage transfers of control of
publicly held corporations. No such evidence has been offered, nor has such a need
been demonstrated."
42. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships (1981), 97
L.Q. Rev. 51 at p. 53. See also Jones, Unjust Enrichmentand the Fiduciary'sDuty
of Loyalty (1968), 84 L.Q. Rev. 472; Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries(Toronto:
The Carswell Company Limited, 1981) p. 71 .
43. Shepherd, supra, note 42 at p. 61.
44. See, supra, text accompanying note 20.
45. See, infra, note 72.
46. Shepherd, supra, note 42 at p. 56. See also Weinrib, The FiduciaryObligation
(1975), 25 U. Toronto L.J. 1.
47. Weinrib, supra, note 46 at p. 15. See also Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware (1974), 83 Yale L. J. 663, who states, at p.671,
that ". . .business should be conducted fairly, honestly, and competently. Indeed,
these ingredients are essential to raise capital and make the system work.";
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Trust law describes the fiduciary concept in terms of the duty of
loyalty, 4 8 and in cases of unjustifiable enrichment, provides the
remedy of the constructive trust to ensure the sharing of property
which has been obtained by one party, but which in equity belongs
to, or should be shared with, others. 49 Corporate law has
increasingly protected shareholders from transactions abusive to the
corporation, and, ultimately, to the shareholders, through the
employment of the fiduciary concept, as in the corporate
opportunity cases. 50 Securities law interacts with corporate law, as
its essential purpose is to protect shareholders and ensure fairness in
order to promote economic efficiency by the maintenance of
confidence in the capital markets.
An analysis of corporate control transactions in terms of a
"synthetic approach" 5 1 at the interface of unjustifiable enrichment
and corporate, securities, and trust law leads us to conclude that,
based upon this approach, majority shareholders should have a
fiduciary duty to ensure that other shareholders share in a premium
obtained on the sale of control. The seller of control is unjustifiably
enriched at the expense of the minority shareholder if a control
premium is not shared. Fairness and justice demand that there
should be some legal mechanism to assure that a control premium is
shared with other shareholders by the seller of control. One might
be justified in departing from concepts of fairness and justice if it
were necessary. to assure that take-over bids were not unduly
impeded, since take-over bids may assist in achieving economic
efficiency in the private sector. What evidence there has been to
Submission of the Toronto Stock Exchange to the Ontario Securities Commission,
Follow-up offers Regarding Premium Transactions,TSE Notice to Members No.

1856, April 11, 1979, which states, at pp. 5-6, that: "In the simplest terms, the
long-term effectiveness of Canada's capital markets. . .in raising capital to meet
industry's requirements depends upon investor confidence. This, in turn, assumes a
public market in which all shareholders are offered an equal opportunity to
participate rateably in any sale of shares pursuant to a favourable offer for the
purchase of controlling shares in their corporation."
48. See Waters, D.W.M., Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto: The Carswell

Company Limited, 1974) p. 3 3 .
49. See Baker, P.V. & Langan P.St.J., Snell's Principlesof Equity (28th. ed.),
London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1982, pp. 192-193.

50. See e.g., CanadianAero Services Ltd. v. O'Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592; Cook
v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.).

51. Samek, The Synthetic Approach and Unjustifiable Enrichment (1977), 27 U.
Toronto L. J. 335 at p. 337. See also Fridman, Restitution Revindicated, or The
Wonderful World of ProfessorSamek (1979), 29 U. Toronto L.J. 160.
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date does not, however, indicate that take-over bids in Ontario or
Canada have been unduly impeded by the follow-up offer
obligation. We believe that legislators should implement an equal
opportunity law, as has been the case in Ontario, since one cannot,
and perhaps should not, rely on the judicial system to develop either
the corporate asset theory or the fiduciary duty theory to protect
minority shareholders.
III. HistoricalBackground to the Follow-Up Offer Obligation
The advent of modern securities legislation in Canada can be
52
ascribed to the enactment of The Securities Act, 1966 (Ontario),
which implemented the recommendations of the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario.5 3 Concern about the legality and ethics of several
take-over bids led to the adoption, in 1963, of a voluntary code of
take-over bid procedure by a group of associations. 54 Since the

52. S.O. 1966, c. 142. See generally, Bray, "Recent Developments in Securities
Administration in Ontario: The Securities Act, 1966", in J. Ziegel, ed., Studies in
CanadianCompany Law 415, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) at pp. 417-419 and
pp. 437-439.
53. March 11, 1965 (hereinafter the "Kimber Report"). Mr. Kimber was
appointed chairman of the commission in 1963 and, upon his appointment, he
recommended to the then Attorney General that a committee (namely, the Kimber
Committee) be appointed to study the securities laws. The suggestion was
accepted, and the Kimber Committee was established in October 1963. See J.C.
Baillie, The Protectionof the Investor in Ontario (1965), 8 Can. Pub. Admin. 172,
325 at p. 207. The Kimber Committee had the following terms of reference, as set
out in the Kimber Report at p. 6, para. 1.01: "To review and report upon, in the
light of modern business conditions and practices, the provisions and working of
securities legislation in Ontario and in particular to consider the problems of
take-over bids and of 'insider' trading, the degrees of disclosure of information to
shareholders, the requirements as to proxy solicitation, procedures as to primary
distribution of securities to the public and like matters, and generally to recommend
what, if any, changes in the law are desirable."
Prior to the implementation of the Kimber Report recommendations, securities
legislation in Ontario was directed primarily to disclosure of relevant facts to
potential purchasers of securities in primary distributions and to control of market
actors through licensing requirements; control of market practices was basically left
to enforcement through the Criminal Code or to the common law. See Creber,
"Take-over Bids, Insider Trading and Proxy Requirements", in Developments in
Company Law - Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 235
(Toronto: Richard De Boo Limited, 1968) at p. 235; Kimber Report, p. 9, para.
1.16.
54. "A Recommended Code of Procedure to be applied in connection with
Take-over Bids" (1963), prepared after consultation among members of the
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voluntary code was not followed in many take-over bids, the
Kimber Report recommended that it be supplanted by legislative
measures. 5 5 These measures were ". . .designed to protect the
general public by averting potential abuses while impeding as little
as possible the use of the take-over bid technique", 56 and focused
on adequate and timely disclosure of information to offeree
shareholders, in order ".

.

to permit them to come to a reasoned

57
decision as to the desirability of accepting a bid for their shares."
The Kimber Committee did not adopt a definition of a take-over bid
in terms of the acquisition of legal control, as that would have left
free from regulation those offers where the objective was the
acquisition of effective, but not necessarily legal, control. The
recommended definition was thus an offer (other than by private
agreement or by purchase on a stock exchange or in an
over-the-counter market) made to the holders of voting shares of a
public company, which would, if accepted, give the bidder more
than twenty percent of the outstanding voting shares. 58 Since the
Kimber Report recommended that private agreements be an
exception from the take-over bid requirements, the crucial question
of the right of minority shareholders to share in a control premium
paid to majority shareholders was left open, as follows:
It follows from the suggested definition of a take-over bid that the
Committee's recommendations for a statutory code will not relate
to the acquisition or intended acquisition, by way of private
agreement, of blocks of shares which represent legal or effective
control. The Committee recognizes that, as a result, its
recommendations will not embrace situations where control of a
public company changes hands under circumstances in which the
general body of shareholders is not afforded the same opportunity
to dispose of their shares (at a possible premium over market) as
is enjoyed by a control group. We are of the opinion that the
evolution of a legal doctrine which may impose upon directors or
other insiders of a company who constitute a control group a

Executive Committees of the Trust Companies Association of Canada, the
Investment Dealers' Association of Canada, The Toronto Stock Exchange
(hereinafter the "TSE"), the Montreal Stock Exchange, the Vancouver Stock
Exchange, and the Canadian Stock Exchange. See the Kimber Report, supra, note
53 at p. 21, para. 3.06. See also Creber, supra, note 53 at p. 2 4 5; Baillie, supra,

note 53 at p. 207.
55. Kimber Report, supra, note 53 at p. 21, para. 3.06.
56. Ibid, at p. 22, para. 3.07.
57. Ibid, at p. 22, para. 3.10.
58. Ibid, at p. 23, para. 3.11.
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fiduciary duty toward other shareholders of such company in
cases of control is, apart from insider trading 59
aspects, a matter to
be left to development by the judicial process.
One can say, with the benefit of hindsight, that this decision by
the Kimber Committee was perhaps unfortunate, given the lack of
subsequent judicial development providing minority shareholders
with an opportunity to share in a premium paid for control. The
Kimber Committee was obviously concerned about the equal
treatment of all shareholders, because it recommended pro rata
acceptance where shares deposited under a bid exceeded the number
specified in the offer, 60 and provided that where an offeror increases
the price of his offer, the higher price should be paid for shares
accepted on the initial, as well as the amended, offer. 6 ' The
recommendation of the Kimber Report to exempt private
agreements was implemented in The Securities Act, 1966, where an
"exempt offer" was defined to include "an offer to purchase shares
by way of private agreement with individual shareholders and not
made to shareholders generally".62 No limit was placed on the
number of private agreements that could be effected, thus
permitting a possible interpretation that any number of individual
shareholders could be approached with an offer while still coming
within the terms of the exemption. 63 The Securities Amendment
Act, 1971 narrowed the "exempt offer" definition by replacing it
with the definition of "an offer to purchase shares by private
agreement with fewer than 15 shareholders and not made to
64
shareholders generally."
59. Ibid, at p. 23, para. 3.12. Baillie, supra, note 53, states, at p. 259, that: "The
Committee very wisely avoids the difficult problem of whether and to what extent a
small group holding the majority of the shares should be liable to the minority
shareholders when the members of the group sell their shares at a price in excess of
that available to the minority". He did not give reasons for his belief that the
Kimber Committee had made a correct judgment.
60. Kimber Report, supra, note 53 at p. 24, para. 3.15 and p. 25, para. 3.17.
61. lbid, at p. 26, para. 3.22.
62. S.O. 1966, c. 142, clause 80(b)(i); "take-over bid" was defined in clause
80(g).
63. See Creber, supra, note 53 at p. 246.
64. S.O. 1971 vol. 2, c. 31, section 22 (emphasis added). Section 22 of the 1971
Act was added following the recommendation in the Report of the Committee of the
Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems of DisclosureRaisedfor Investors
by Business Combinations and Private Placements February, 1980 (herein called
the "Merger Study"), which stated, at p.9 2 , para. 7.10, that: "At some point the
number of private agreements suggest a general offer. We suggest they be restricted

to fifteen".

112 The Dalhousie Law Journal

In 1970, the OSC reconsidered, in its Merger Study, the question
of fairness to minority shareholders in take-over bid legislation, and
rejected the view that exempt offers should be prohibited, requiring
all acquisitions to be made pro rata to all shareholders. "Such a
conclusion would reduce incentive to a common denominator,
including the incentive to control, manage, build, and then divest to
take the benefit of those efforts. The solution providing equality is
simple. The result of such a solution would be profound."16 5 The
study referred specifically to the private agreement exemption, and
reached the same conclusion as the Kimber Report, namely, that the
control premium question should be left to judicial development as a
matter of corporate law:
The exemption raises the question as to whether some special
liability or responsibility should result when the purchaser
through a private agreement pays a premium over the market
price. In this connection we have considered the approach taken
through the so-called "City Code" in the United Kingdom
developed by the City of London Investment Committee to
govern take-overs. 66 Under it the directors who effectively
control as well as controlling shareholders represented on the
board should not sell that control without obtaining the buyer's
undertaking to extend a comparable offer to the remaining
shareholders. This condition has in fact been required in a
number of cases by Canadian controlling shareholders. The U.K.
rule may be waived "in very exceptional circumstances" as to
which the City Panel must be consulted in advance.
This rule in the City Code has a most appealing appearance of
fairness. On the other hand .. .it does move further down the

road towards removing all incentive for entrepreneurship. The
control person is subjected to insider liability. The draft Business
Corporations Act (Bill 125) forecasts more stringent restrictions
on the conduct of management. The concept of oppression of the
minority has been rejected by the Select Committee in favour of
statutory standards. 6 7 . . .we have not yet concluded that control
65. Supra, note 64 at p. 89, para. 7.04.
66. The City Code on Take-over and Mergers (Rev'd ed. February, 1981, as

amended June,

1982). See generally, Blank, M.V., and Greystoke, A.L.,

Weinberg and Blank on Take-Overs and Mergers (4th ed. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1979) c. 12, para. 1201; Gower, L.C.B. Review of Investor Protection

(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1982) pp. 36-37, paras.
3.27-3.28.
67. The oppression remedy is now provided for in the Business Corporations Act,
1982, S.O. 1982, c.4, s.247 (hereinafter the "OBCA"). Compare CBCA, s.234.
See generIally, Beck, "Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980s", in Corporate

Corporate Take-Over Bids by Private Agreement 113

persons have so abused their positions as to require special
treatment as a matter of securities legislation. Accordingly, we
find no reason to recommend deviating from the conclusions
reached in paragraph 3.12 of the Kimber Report that as to
questions of fairness of treatment as between shareholders this is
a matter for corporation law and the courts. Securities legislation
may then follow the lead given. 6 8
It is regrettable that the Merger Study recommended that the
question of fairness of treatment between shareholders was a matter
of corporate law, as it has been noted that "the distinction between
corporate and securities law is a largely artificial one that was
developed in the United States to meet distinctive constitutional
problems in that country.''69 Indeed, the question of fairness of
treatment as between shareholders is a matter that should be
addressed by securities regulators in order to ensure fairness in the
capital markets. A corporation that wishes to have public
shareholders should not be permitted to accept the benefits of going
public, such as easier access to capital, without also accepting the
responsibility to ensure fair treatment for the public shareholders.
In 1973, the Report on Mergers, Amalgamations and Certain
Related Matters by Select Committee on Company Law 70 was
released. It stated the control premium problem in the following
terms:
The acquisition of effective control by private agreement almost
invariably involves the payment of a premium to the selling
shareholders and in many cases no general offer is made to the
other shareholders to acquire their shares on the same or
substantially similar terms. The other shareholders are in the
position where control of the corporation in which they have
invested has changed leaving them with two options - to remain
as shareholders and accept the changed situation or to sell their
shares on the market at a price which will undoubtedly be less
than the price received by the controlling shareholders
.. .should the legislation remove the present private agreement

Law in the 80s, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 311 (Don

Mills: Richard De Boo Publishers, 1982) at pp. 312-320.
68. Merger Study, supra, note 64 at pp. 91-92, paras. 7.08-7.09 (without
footnotes).
69. Baillie, "Shareholders' Remedies", in New Developments in the Law of
Remedies, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 21 (Don Mills:

Richard De Boo Limited, 1981) at p. 29.
70. Tabled in the Legislative Assembly by William Hodgson, M.P.P. Chairman,
3rd Session, 29th Legislature (herein called the "Hodgson Report").
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exemption or should the legislation continue the exemption but
require, as a condition, that a general offer 7be
made by the offeror
1
to all other shareholders of the same class?
Representatives of the OSC testified before the Select Committee
that they had changed their position since the publication of the
Merger Study and that they favoured the requirement of a general
offer to the remaining shareholders. 7 2 The Select Committee was,
however, divided on the issue, with the majority favouring the
maintenance of the private agreement exemption7 3 and the minority
arguing that the exemption should be made conditional upon the
person acquiring control making an equivalent offer, within sixty
days of the acquisition of control, to the remaining shareholders of
the same class. 74 This offer could not be conditional on any level of
acceptance, but the OSC would have had discretion to provide an
exemption from the requirement where there was a compelling
76
reason to do so 75 and the form of consideration could be different.
The minority of the Select Committee stated their views as follows:
While the elimination or reduction of the premium on the sale of
control may be viewed as a move towards removing an incentive
for entrepreneurship, the minority of the Committee feels that on
analysis the argument in favour of permitting such a premium
may not be as strong as it appears. Conceptually, at least, each
share in the capital of a company is the same as every other share
of the same class and entitles the holder to an aliquot interest in
the company. When a controlling shareholder sells control, the
thing he is really selling is corporate assets and the right to
control the use of those assets and those assets belong to all of the
shareholders, not merely the controller. There are . . . valid
arguments to be made on a conceptual basis that any premium on
the sale of control should be shared by all shareholders. The
minority of the Committee rejects the argument that the
71. Ibid, at p. 28, para. 1.
72. lbid, at para. 2.
73. Ibid, at pp. 30-31, para. 7. It was favoured primarily on the ground that
corporate shares are a form of personal property which an owner should be entitled
to freely sell and that an obligation of a general offer to shareholders would reduce
entrepreneurial incentives for a person to develop a business by denying such a

person a "well merited premium for his efforts".
74. Ibid, at p. 31, para. 8.
75. Ibid, at p. 33, para. 13. The OSC would have discretion to exempt, for
example, where an acquisition of twenty percent of the voting shares would not
constitute an acquisition of effective control. See, ibid, at p. 33, para. 12.
76. Ibid, at pp. 31-32, para. 10. For example, notwithstanding that cash was paid
to the majority, the minority could be paid in securities.
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requirement for a general offer would lead to economic hardship
as a justification for maintaining the present exemption. The
minority is not entirely persuaded that economic hardship would
be an inevitable result. The minority adopts the principles of the
City Code on this important matter and agrees with the language
of the introduction to the City Code that the requirement for a
general offer must be regarded as "good standard commercial
behaviour based upon a concept of equity between one
shareholder and another". The argument that the City Code is not
a legal enactment is, in the view of the minority, not convincing
since the provisions of77the City Code are invariably followed in
almost every instance.
With the groundwork for modern securities legislation having
been laid in The Securities Act, 1966, as amended, 7 8 the Ontario
government commenced the process of making substantial revisions
to the securities legislation of the province in the 1970s, which
ultimately led to the resolution of the problem of control premiums
by the retention of the private agreement exemption, together with
the adoption of the follow-up offer obligation in Bill 7, The
Securities Act, 1978. 7 9 Apparently, no economic studies were

77. Ibid, at p. 31, para. 9.
78. The Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c.142, as am. by The Securities
Amendment Act, 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 92, The Securities Amendment Act, 1968,
S.O. 1968, c. 123, The Securities Amendment Act, 1969, S.O. 1968-69, c. 116,
and The Securities Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971 vol. 2., c. 31.
79. S.O. 1978, c. 47. Bill 7 received first reading February 28, 1978, third reading
June 23, 1978, and was proclaimed in force September 15, 1979. See generally,
Baillie, "Securities Regulation in the '70s", in J. Ziegel, ed., 2 Studies in
CanadianCompany Law 343 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1973) at p. 345.
Several bills were introduced in the Legislature prior to Bill 7. Bill 154, which
was introduced in 1972 as The Securities Act, 1972 and received first reading on
June 1, 1972, continued the private agreement exemption of The Securities Act,
1966, as did Bill 75, The Securities Act, 1974, which was introduced to replace
Bill 154 and received first reading on June 7, 1974. In September 1974, the OSC
published a set of draft regulations under Bill 75. Bill 98, The Securities Act, 1975,
which received first reading on May 30, 1975, substantially implemented the
recommendations of the minority of the Select Committee in the Hodgson Report
by eliminating the private agreement exemption, so that an offeror making a
take-over bid would have had to make the offer to all security holders whose last
address, as shown on the books of the offeree company, was in Ontario. The
obligation would have applied even to a purchaser of control not paying a control
premium, that is, even a purchaser making an offer at or below the market value,
which one commentator termed "an unnecessarily burdensome restriction". See
Dey, Securities Reform in Ontario: The Securities Act, 1975 (1975), 1 Can. Bus.
L.J. 20, at p. 38. Dey expressed concern for the economic implications of the
elimination of the private agreement exemption in Bill 98, stating, at p. 38, that:
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undertaken to consider the implications of the maintenance of the
private agreement exemption with a follow-up offer obligation." 0
Rather, the solution proposed by Bill 7 was a compromise between
those advocating minority shareholder protection and those
advocating the improvement of the integrity of the capital markets
without placing undue restrictions on the entrepreneur when dealing
in the public marketplace. 81 The follow-up offer obligation did,
however, create considerable controversy, and the then minister
resolved the matter by instructing the OSC chairman to arrange for
public hearings, following which guidelines would be published of
the circumstances in which the OSC would grant exemptions from
the obligation to make a follow-up offer before the new act became
law:
After careful consideration, we have concluded that it is
prejudicial to the credibility of the public marketplace to permit
the owner of a corporation who has taken in minority
shareholders to dispose of his shares subsequently at a premium
that is unavailable to the minority ...
Under Bill 98, the acquisition of a company by way of a share offer will be a
very expensive proposition. Fewer companies will be able to muster the
resources to undertake the payment of a premium for control and the extension
of an offer upon similar terms to the balance of the target company
shareholders. It will be only the large companies which will be able to make the
acquisitions - probably resulting in increased concentration of industry. Bill 98
is a piece of legislation which should receive some consideration from the
recently appointed Royal Commission studying the concentration of business in
Canada.
Bill 20, The Securities Act, 1977, which received first reading on April 5, 1977,
continued the withdrawal of the exemption for take-overs by private agreement so
bids would have to be pro rata. See generally, Johnston, Canadian Securities
Regulation, supra, note 8 at p. 341. Bill 20 was reintroduced as Bill 30, which
received first reading on June 29, 1977 and continued the exclusion of the private
agreement exemption. Bill 7 was then introduced in 1978.
80. Notwithstanding some concern that the economic implications of regulatory
changes be considered. See, for example, Dey, supra, note 79 at p. 38; Baillie,
supra, note 79 at p. 345.
81. See New Securities Legislation (Toronto: Department of Continuing
Education, Law Society of Upper Canada, May 1978) per Baillie at p. 20, and Dey
at pp. 22-23. Due to the technical nature of securities legislation, the drafting of the
act was exclusively the work of the OSC. See Connelly, "Securities Regulation
and Freedom of Information", Commission on Freedom of Information and
Individual Privacy, Research Publication 8, (Ontario 1979) at p. 91; Baillie,
supra, note 79 at p. 353, argues that the legislative process provides a more
meaningful review in the United States. See also Legislature of Ontario Standing
Committee on the Administration of Justice on vote 1502, commercial standards
program; item 1, securities (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 240A, per Mr. Renwick at pp.
241A-242A.
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However, we recognize that situations could arise in which the
provisions of the Bill could impede or even prevent the
consummation of a desirable transaction. For example, where a
control block is held outside Canada, over-riding economic
interests might dictate that the repatriation of that block should be
permitted even if a premium must be paid. Also, sale of a
comparatively small number of shares might sometimes tilt the
balance of control; it is doubtful that such a transaction 8 should
2
trigger the obligation for a follow-up offer to the minority.
In compliance with the request, the commission published draft
guidelines in August 1978,83 which were substantially revised and
eventually adopted as OSC Policy 3-41 before the act came into
84
force.
IV. The Frameworkof the Act
(a) The Act and Regulation
Part XIX of the act provides for the regulation of take-over bids,
which are defined in clause 88(l)(k), as follows:
(i) an offer made to security holders, the last address of
any of whom as shown on the books of the offeree
company or other issuer 8 5 is in Ontario, to purchase
directly or indirectly voting securities 86 of the company
or other issuer,
82. The then Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations, The Hon. Larry
Grossman (June 15, 1978), in OSC Weekly Summary, 11 August 1978,
Supplement -X", p. 4.
83. OSC Weekly Summary, 11 August 1978, Supplement "X". The draft
guidelines stated that the OSC would consider any application for an exemption on
its merits, taking into account all relevant circumstances, and set out, at p. 2, three
specific situations which the OSC indicated would be appropriate cases for an
exemption from the follow-up offer obligation:
1. Where a Canadian offeror pays a nonresident of Canada a premium for
control of a Canadian corporation on the ground that the national economic
policy would favour repatriation of control;
2. Where the controller is an owner-manager and wishes to retire and transfer
his interest at a premium to employees of the corporation; and
3. Where the majority of the noncontrolling shareholders agree to waive their
rights to the follow-up offer.
84. Infra, note 107.
85. Paragraph 1(1)4: " 'company' means any corporation, incorporated association, incorporated syndicate or other incorporated organization"; paragraph l(1) 18:
" 'issuer' means a person or company who has outstanding issues, or proposes to
issue, a security".
86. Paragraph 1(1)44: " 'voting security' means any security other than a debt
security of an issuer carrying a voting right either under all circumstances or under
some circumstances that have occurred and are continuing."
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(ii) the acceptance by a person or company of an offer to
sell voting securities of a company or other issuer and
such acceptance shall be deemed to constitute an offer
to purchase and the person or company accepting the
offer shall be deemed to be an offeror, 87 or
(iii) a combination of an offer to purchase referred to in
subclause (i) and an acceptance of an offer to sell
referred to in subclause (ii),
where the voting securities which are the subject of the offer to
purchase, the acceptance of the offer to sell or the combination
thereof, as the case may be, together with the offeror's presently
owned securities will in the aggregate exceed 20 percent of the
outstanding voting securities of the company or other issuer and
where two or more persons or companies make or accept offers
jointly or in concert or intending to exercise jointly or in concert
any voting rights attaching to the securities to be acquired, then
the securities owned by each of them shall be included in the
calculation of the percentage of the outstanding voting88securities
of the company or other issuer owned by each of them;
The Securities Amendment Act, 1982 would clarify the second
branch of the definition of a take-over bid, contained in
sub-paragraph 88( 1)(k)(ii), by specifying that the test of an Ontario
address for the offeree security holder applies to an offer to sell, as
well as an offer to purchase. 8 9 The proposed amendments would
87. Clause 88(l)(h): " 'offeror' means a person or company other than an agent,
who makes a take-over bid or an issuer bid and where two or more persons or
companies make offers, (i) jointly or in concert, or (ii) intending to exercise
jointly or in concert any voting rights attaching to the security acquired through the
offers, then each of them shall be deemed to be an offeror if the offer made by any
of them is a take-over bid".
88. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, clause 88(l)(k).
89. Bill 176, 2nd Sess., 32nd Legislature Ontario, 1982, 2nd Reading: November
2, 1982. Section 31 provides, inter alia, that:
(2) Subsection 88(1) of the said Act is amended by adding thereto the following
clause:
(ea) "offer to purchase" is an offer to purchase, the acceptance by a person
or company of an offer to sell or a combination of an offer to purchase and an
acceptance of an offer to sell.
(4) Clause 88(l)(k) of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted
therefor:
(k) "take-over bid" means an offer to purchase, directly or indirectly,
voting securities of a company or other issuer made to security holders, the
last address of any of whom as shown on the books of the offeree company
or other issuer is in Ontario, where the voting securities which are the subject
of the offer to purchase, together with the offeror's presently owned
securities, will carry in the aggregate, 10 per cent or more of the voting
rights attached to the voting securities of the company or other issuer that
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also change the threshhold level of a take-over bid from twenty
percent of the currently outstanding voting securities to ten percent
of the voting rights attaching to the voting securities that would be
outstanding on a fully diluted basis. However, a follow-up offer
would only be required where the twenty percent level is
exceeded. 90
The act provides for certain exemptions from the requirements of
Part XIX, including, inter alia, the private agreement exemption, as
follows:
88(2) Subject to subsection 91(1), a take-over bid is exempted
from the requirements of this Part where,
(c) it is an offer to purchase securities by way of agreements with
fewer than fifteen security holders and not made pursuant to
an offer to security holders generally, but where an offeror
enters into an agreement to purchase securities from a person
or company and the offeror knows or ought to know after a
reasonable inquiry that,
(i) one or more other persons or companies on whose
behalf that person or company is acting as trustee,
executor, administrator or other legal representatives,
have a direct beneficial interest in those securities, then
each of such others shall be included in the determination of the number of security holders with whom there
would be outstanding on the exercise of all currently exercisable rights of
purchase, conversion or exchange relating to voting securities and where two
or more persons or companies make offers to purchase jointly or in concert
or intending to exercise jointly or in concert any voting rights attaching to the
securities to be acquired, then the voting rights attaching to the securities
owned by each of them shall be included in the calculation of the percentage
that the voting rights attaching to the voting securities of the company or
other issuer owned by each of them is of all voting rights that would be
attached to all voting securities that would be outstanding on the exercise of
all currently exercisable rights of purchase, conversion or exchange relating
to voting securities traded.
(5) The said subsection 88(t) is further amended by adding thereto the
following clause:
(m) "voting security" includes,
(i) a security currently convertible into a voting security or into another
security that is convertible into a voting security,
(ii) a currently exercisable option or right to acquire a voting security or
another security that is convertible into a voting security, or
(iii) a security carrying an option or right referred to in sub-clause (ii).
The change in the threshhold level from twenty percent to ten percent brings
the act into conformity with the CBCA and the OBCA, but makes the level
inconsistent with other provincial securities legislation.
90. Securities Amendment Act, 1982, supra, note 89, s.34.
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have been agreements, but where an inter vivos trust
has been established by a single settlor or where an
estate has not vested in all persons beneficially entitled
thereto, the trust or estate shall be considered to be a
single security holder in such determination, or
(ii) the person or company acquired the securities during
the two years preceding the date of the agreement with
the intent that they should be sold under such
agreement, then each person or company from whom
those securities were acquired shall be included in the
determination of the number of security holders with
whom there have been agreements;
The follow-up offer obligation is provided for in subsection
91(1), as follows:
91(1) Where a take-over bid is effected without compliance with
section 8991 in reliance on the exemption in clause 88(2)(c), if
there is a published market 9 2 in the class of securities acquired
and the value of the consideration paid for any of the securities
acquired exceeds the market price at the date of the relevant
agreement plus reasonable brokerage fees or other commissions,
the offeror shall within 180 days after the date of the first of the
agreements comprising the take-over bid, offer to purchase all of
the additional securities of the same class owned by the security
holders, the last registered address of whom is in Ontario or in a
uniform act province, 93 at and for a consideration per security at
least equal in value to the greatest consideration paid under any
91. Section 89 contains conditions relating, inter alia, to disclosure, timing, and
equal treatment of offeree shareholders.

92. Clause 88(1)0): " 'published market', as to any class of securities, means a
stock exchange recognized by the Commission for the purposes of this Part on
which such securities are listed, or any other market on which such securities are
traded if the prices at which they have been traded on that market are regularly
published in a bona fide newspaper or business financial publication of general and
regular paid circulation."
OSC Policy 3-43, paragraph 3, states that the commission recognizes only The
Toronto Stock Exchange for the purpose of the definition. This does not, however,
mean that the TSE is the only stock exchange which constitutes a "published
market", because clause 88(1)(j) refers to "any other market on which such
securities are traded if the prices at which they have been traded on that market are
regularly published in a bona fide newspaper or business or financial publication of
general and regular paid circulation."
93. Clause 88(l)(l): " 'uniform act province' means a province or territory of
Canada designated in the regulations as a province or territory which has legislation
in effect containing provisions substantially the same as this Part and section 129."
The act was intended to be a model for the other provinces in Canada. In
introducing Bill 30, The Securities Act, 1977, to the Ontario Legislature on
November 24, 1977, the then minister, The Hon. Larry Grossman, commented, in

[1977] O.S.C.B. 272, that: "The securities bill is designed to provide a model for
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such agreements, and9 4that offer shall be a take-over bid for the
purposes of this Part.
other provinces. We have received reasonable assurance that its adoption as a
uniform provincial Act will afford all Canadians with the high level of protection
which will be enjoyed by Ontario investors." In introducing Bill 7, the same
minister stated that he was "optimistic that the Bill would establish the precedent
for uniform securities legislation across Canada." See [1978] O.S.C.B. 52. The
act was not implemented as a uniform act across Canada and therefore no "uniform
act province" has been designated in the regulation.
94. Since the follow-up offer is stated to be "a take-over bid for the purposes of
this Part", it appears that the provisions of the act, with respect to take-over bids
generally, are applicable to the follow-up offer. If the follow-up offer itself must
comply with the conditions in the act with respect to take-over bids, then it should
be possible to take advantage of the provisions permitting conditional offers (para.
89(1)12). Thus, it is arguable that the follow-up offer could be made conditional on
the tender of a specified minimum number of the outstanding securities of the
offeree company. A question arises as to whether an offeror can maintain that it has
satisfied its follow-up offer obligation under the act in circumstances where the
offeror refuses to take up and pay for any securities deposited under the follow-up
offer, on the ground that the specified minimum number of securities has not been
tendered. This scenario could become a consideration in circumstances where a
follow-up offer obligation exists and the offeror wishes to acquire one hundred
percent of the voting securities of the target company. In these circumstances, a
large shareholder might refuse to tender under the follow-up offer in order to
bargain for consideration in excess of the private agreement consideration. On the
other hand, the ability of an offeror to make a conditional follow-up offer could be
used either to ensure that the offeror obtains all of the outstanding securities of the
target company or to permit the offeror to argue that it has satisfied its obligation to
make a follow-up offer, without having to take up and pay for any further
securities.
This problem was considered in the Dome Energy Limited application for
exemption from the obligation to make a follow-up offer for the outstanding shares
of Hudson's Bay Oil and Gas Company Limited (HBOG). See Re Hudson's Bay
Oil and Gas Company Limited (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 44C; Order (1981), 2 O.S.C.B.
149B. It was Dome's intention to acquire all of the outstanding shares of HBOG,
including a twelve-percent block held by the Hudsons Bay Company, while at the
same time satisfying any follow-up offer obligation it might have had under the act.
Although Dome advanced the argument for an exemption on the ground that it
would be providing equivalent consideration under a plan of arrangement, it took
the position that the OSC exempting order should provide that Dome had satisfied
its follow-up obligation if the plan were put to the shareholders, even in
circumstances where the plan was not approved by the shareholders. Counsel for
Dome argued that the act could be interpreted to provide for the possibility of a
conditional follow-up offer. The commission appeared to acknowledge that this
argument could be made, but it was apparent that the commission would take the
position, at least in exercising its discretion to grant an exempting order, that an
offeror could only satisfy the follow-up offer obligation by taking up and paying for
any and all securities tendered under the follow-up offer. Since the matter has never
explicitly been the subject of a decision by the commission, the nature of conditions
that may be imposed by an offeror seeking to satisfy a follow-up offer obligation
remains uncertain.
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Subsection 91(1) thus sets out four conditions which must be
satisfied before the follow-up offer obligation arises: (1) there must
be a take-over bid; (2) the take-over bid must be made by way of
private agreement in reliance on the exemption in clause 88(2)(c);
(3) there must be a published market in the class of securities
acquired pursuant to the take-over bid; and (4) the offeror must
have paid a consideration with a value in excess of the published
market price on the market in which the securities of the offeree
company are traded. "Market price" is defined in subsection
163(3) of the regulation as meaning, in general terms, the trading
price plus fifteen percent. 9 5 The OSC has the power, under clause
99(b) of the act, to determine "[ulpon an application by an
interested person or company" the market price (which may be
different from the published market price) of the securities at any
date where it has determined that the published market price was
affected by an anticipated take-over bid or by improper
96
manipulation.
It was recognized that the enactment of the follow-up offer
obligation in Ontario would not preclude avoidance of the
obligation by the purchase of controlling shares made outside of
Ontario, but it was expected that the obligation would be enforced
nationally through the enactment of corresponding legislation in the

95. Section 163(3) of the regulation provides that "[flor the purposes of subsection
91(1) of the Act, 'market price' of a class of securities on a particular date is an
amount 15 percent in excess of the simple average of the closing price of securities
of that class for each day on which there was a closing price and falling not more
than ten business days before the relevant date (0. Reg. 190/80, s.27)." Reg.,
subs. 163(1), defines "closing price", and Reg., subs. 163(2), provides that where
there are two published markets, the one with greatest volume should be used in the
calculation. Reg., subs. 163(4), provides that there has to be a closing price for the
securities within ten days, or else it is deemed that there is no published market.
96. "99. Upon an application by an interested person or company, the
Commission may, subject to such terms and conditions as it may impose,
(b) where the Commission is satisfied that the market price of securities of any
class determined in accordance with the regulations, by reference to the price of
such securities as established by trades on a published market was affected by an
anticipated take-over bid or by improper manipulation, determine the market
price of such securities at any date, such determination to be based on a finding
by the Commission as to the price at which a holder of securities of that class
could reasonably have expected to dispose of his securities immediately prior to
the relevant date excluding any change in price reasonably attributable to the
anticipated take-over bid or to the improper manipulation..."
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other provinces. 9 7 Thus, subsection 91(1) requires the follow-up
offer to be made to "security holders, the last registered address of
whom is in Ontario or in a uniform act province." Anisman and
Hogg comment that:
Given the policy implicit in the [act], even the requirement that
the offer be made to securityholders in a uniform act province is
an unsatisfactory halfway measure for unless all of the other
provinces adopt the Ontario [act], the offeror may still exclude
some of the minority shareholders; on a policy basis, therefore, it
would have been preferable to have required the
offer to be made
98
at least to all shareholders resident in Canada.
Subsection 91(2) provides that the follow-up offer obligation
applies in circumstances where the purchaser acquires indirect
control of an offeree company, pursuant to an arrangement
established to avoid the follow-up offer obligation. If the purchaser
acquires shares of a holding company established by a seller to hold
shares of the public offeree company, then, if the holding
corporation was established to avoid the follow-up offer obligation,
the purchaser must make a follow-up offer for the shares of the
offeree company, as it is the "true target company". A related
provision, subsection 91(3), provides for equal consideration as
follows: "Subject to any decision of the Commission under section
99, where a take-over bid or an issuer bid is made, all holders of the
same class of securities shall be offered the same consideration and
no collateral agreement with any such holders shall have the effect,
directly or indirectly, of offering such holders a consideration of
greater value for their securities than that offered to the other
holders of the same class of securities." Section 99 includes
grounds for an exemption from the follow-up offer obligation:
Upon an application by an interested person9 9 or company, the
Commission may, subject to such terms and conditions as it may
impose,
97. See, supra, note 93. See also Anisman, The Proposalsfor a Securities Market
Law for Canada:Purpose and Process (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329 at p. 353;
Emerson, "Business Finance Under the 'Closed System' of the Ontario Securities
Act: Statutory Scheme and Pitfalls", in CorporateLaw in the 80s, Special Lectures
of the Law Society of Upper Canada29, supra, note 67 at p. 30, n.3.
98. Anisman and Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation", in 3 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada 135 (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) at p. 150, n.72.
99. Quaere whether the director under the act could be considered to be an
"interested person" so that the commission could initiate of its own motion a
proceeding relating to the discretionary powers set out in section 99?
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(a) decide that an offeror shall not be obligated to comply with
subsection 91(1) where the Commission finds that the offeror
will not or did not acquire through the offer the power or
authority to control the business or affairs of the offeree
company;

(c) decide for the purposes of section 91 that a consideration
proposed to be offered by an offeror is, or is not, at least equal
in value to the greatest consideration paid under the relevant
agreements;
(d) decide for the purposes of section 91 that a collateral
agreement or arrangement with a selling security holder is
made for reasons other than to increase the value of the
consideration paid to him for his securities and may be entered
into notwithstanding that section;
(e) exempt any person or company from any requirements of
Part where in its opinion it would not be prejudicial to the
public interest to do so;100

In section 129, the act imposes a civil liability on an offeror who
fails to make a required follow-up offer or to take up securities
deposited thereunder where an obligation to do so exists under the
act:
An offeror who
(a) does not make the offer to purchase required to be made by
subsection 91(1) at a consideration having a value at least equal
to that required thereby; or
(b) does not take up securities duly deposited under the offer
referred to in clause (a), is liable to pay to the security holders
entitled to receive the offer to purchase, or whose duly deposited
securities were not taken up, a consideration per security equal in
value to the minimum consideration at which the offer is required

100. Since the onus is on the applicant and the OSC exercises considerable
discretion as to whether or not an exemption order should issue, an offeror would
generally be well advised to endeavour to negotiate a provision whereby its
obligation to purchase under the private agreement would be conditional upon
obtaining an exemption from the follow-up obligation. An application to the OSC
for an exemption where such a conditional obligation to purchase exists might have
a greater chance of success where the private agreement purchase has not been
completed, given commission reluctance to issue rulings which have retroactive
effect. See, for example, OSC Policy 2.1 E. (1982), 2 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 54-903 at para. 6.
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by that subsection to be made, or to the excess thereof over the
value of the consideration actually offered, together with
damages, if any. 101
The commission has three primary enforcement powers set out in
Part XXII of the act. Under subsection 122(1), the commission can
obtain an order for compliance:
Where it appears to the Commission that any person or company
has failed to comply with or is violating any decision or provision
of this Act or the Regulations, the Commission may,
notwithstanding the imposition of any penalty in respect of such
non-compliance or violation and in addition to any other rights it
may have, apply to a judge of the High Court for an order,
(a) directing the person or company to comply with the
decision or provision or restraining the person or company
from violating the decision or provision; and
(b) directing the directors and senior officers of the person or
company to cause the person or company to comply with or to
cease violating the decision or provision, and upon the
application the judge may make such order, or such other
order as he thinks fit.
In addition, where such action is, in its opinion, in the public
interest, the commission may order, subject to terms and conditions
it may impose, that trading shall cease in respect of any securities
for such period as is specified in the order. 10 2 Alternatively, the
commission can order that any and all exemptions contained in,
inter alia, section 88 do not apply to a person or company named in
03
the order. 1
(b) Policy Statements
In addition to the act and regulations, one must also consider OSC
10 4
policy statements and notices with respect to follow-up offers.

101. The applicable limitation period, as set out in clause 135(b), provides that an

action under section 129 must be commenced at the earlier of (i) 180 days after the
plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of action, or (ii)

three years after the date of the transaction that gave rise to the cause of action.
102. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, s. 123.
103. Ibid, s. 124.

104. See Notice "Re: Take-over Bids

-

Value of Consideration in Follow-up

Offers" (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 23A, concerning time value of money; Policy 9.2
"Take-Over Bids - Section 99 Applications for Exemptions from the Obligations
[sic] to make a Follow-Up Offer" (1982), 2 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.
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The OSC has stated that its policy statements do not have the force
of law, but that they only indicate how the OSC intends to exercise
its discretionary authority in certain circumstances. 10 5 In some
instances, however, OSC policy statements may represent the
10 6
OSC's interpretation of the law.
In Policy 3-41,107 the commission, in compliance with the
instruction of the then minister,' 0 8 formulated guidelines for the
circumstances in which it would exercise its discretionary powers
under section 99 of the act to provide exemptions from the
follow-up offer obligation. The commission specified three
categories which, it stated, had given rise to the policy concerns
which resulted in the enactment of the follow-up offer obligation:
(a) A sale of control where the result is clearly unfair or abusive
to the remaining shareholders;
(b) The sale of control follows a public distribution of equity
securities of the same corporation (whether newly issued or
derived from the control block) in which it may reasonably
be assumed that investors relied on continued involvement of
the controlling shareholder in the corporation's affairs, and
the sale of control occurs within, say, ten years after the
public distribution; or
(c) The offeror proposes obtaining effective control at a
premium through purchases from fewer than fifteen
shareholders, none of whom individually has effective
control, at a premium unavailable to the remaining
shareholders. ' 0 9
The commission stated that if the sale of control did not fall within
any of the three categories, it would "be favourably disposed to
granting an exemption from the follow-up offer obligation", unless

54-961; Policy 9.3A "Private Agreements Prior to or During Take-Over Bid or
Issuer Bid - Linked Transactions", ibid, paras. 54-962.
105. See Policy 1.1, "OSC Policy Statements - General" (1982), 2 Can. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) para. 54-895, para. 2.
106. See, for example, Policy 9.3A, supra, note 104. See also Baillie, supra, note
69 at p. 30, noting that OSC policies are applied by practising lawyers as if they
had the force of law.
107. "Take-over Bids - Section 99 Applications For Exemptions From the
Obligation to Make a Follow-up Offer After a 'Control Block Premium'
Transaction - The Securities Act, 1978", [1979] 0.S.C.B. 232.
108. Supra, note 82.
109. Supra, note 107 at p. 237.
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other circumstances indicated that the exemption would be contrary
to the public interest. 110 Even if the sale did fall within one of the
listed categories, the commission indicated that it might, under the
following six special circumstances, grant an exemption:"'
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

where national economic policy favours repatriation of control;
sale by an owner-manager to employees;
where the non-controlling shareholders waive the offer;
where a control block is transferred in a bona fide corporate
reorganization where effective control of the block remains with
the parent company but is held after the reorganization by an
affiliate corporation;
(e) the offeror makes available to the other security holders the
consideration required by subs. 91(1) by means that do not
technically qualify as an offer such as an amalgamation, a
winding up with a distribution to the security holders of cash or
assets or if the follow-up offer is made by some other person
which might not be the offeree corporation; and
(f) the offeror was required to purchase the control block without
having made a voluntary decision to do so.112
Policy 3-41 therefore indicated that exemptions from the follow-up
obligation could be expected to be granted, except in certain
specific circumstances, thus greatly narrowing the thrust of the act.
The follow-up offer provisions of the act indicate that the
legislature regarded the sale of control at a premium as being unfair
to the remaining shareholders. It is therefore difficult to understand
why the commission would be prepared to grant exemptions from
the follow-up offer obligation in circumstances which would
constitute a significant departure from legislation providing for the
equal treatment of shareholders. The commission indicated that it

110. Ibid.
11l.Ibid, at pp. 179-181.
112. For example, a regulatory agency which might order the disposition of
shares, pursuant to a buy-sell agreement which permits the disposing party to
"put" the shares to another shareholder at a price in excess of the market. This
excessive price could arise pursuant to a formula, such as that regarding the
calculation of book value, and the purchasing shareholder would not be in a
position to select the price or determine whether or not he made the acquisition.
This example and ground for exemption was suggested to the commission by the
TSE. See Submission of The Toronto Stock Exchange to the Ontario Securities
Commission Concerning Section 91 of The Securities Act, 1978 (October 17, 1978)

at p. 4.
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would be favourably disposed to grant an exemption unless the
result would be "clearly unfair or abusive to the remaining
shareholders","1 3 but the policy of the act indicates that a take-over
bid at a premium by private agreement is, by its very nature, unfair
unless followed by an offer to the minority. Moreover, the
commission stated that, notwithstanding that a transaction fell
within the three enumerated "special policy concerns", it would
consider granting an exemption in six specific situations, which do
not all appear to further the policy objectives of the follow-up offer
obligation. Indeed, it appears that only (d) and (e) can reasonably be
construed within the policy objectives of the act; examples (a) and
(f) are unrelated to the policy concerns upon which the follow-up
offer obligation is predicated, (b) appears to be a situation in which
the follow-up offer should logically apply, and (c) would allow
minority shareholders to be deprived of their right to a follow-up
offer by a two-thirds majority vote of the minority. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the policy was not adhered to by the commission
4
under the chairmanship of Henry Knowles. 1
V. The PracticalApplication of the Follow-Up Offer Obligation:
Administrative and JudicialInterpretationof the Act
(a) Jurisdictionand ExtraterritorialApplication of the Act
(i) Methods ofEnforcing the Follow-up Offer Obligation
Due to the fact that the other provinces did not enact the follow-up
offer obligation 1 5 and because of the national character of many
Canadian securities transactions, the OSC developed, in general
terms, primarily three methods of enforcing the follow-up offer
obligation so that the obligation would not be rendered nugatory by
transactions taking place outside Ontario." 6 While the three
113. Supra, note 109, para. (a).
114. See, Baillie, supra, note 69, stating, at p. 32, that: "Policy 3-41 cannot now

be relied upon as an indication of what exemptions will be granted." Policy 3.41
was not included in the revised OSC policies. See OSC Policy 9.2, supra, note
104.

115. But see recent legislative initiatives in Manitoba, Quebec, and British
Columbia, supra, notes 9, 10, and 11.

116. Henry J. Knowles, Q.C., the then chairman of the OSC, commented on
extraterritoriality in his 1981 Report (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 79A, at p. 83A, as
follows: "If the OSC ignores activities of non-residents that impact on the
securities business in Ontario, then residents will incorporate outside Ontario for
the purpose of avoiding Ontario law. If the OSC ignores the activities of Ontario
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methods are not mutually exclusive, they can be broadly
categorized as follows: (1) a broad interpretation of the act to find
that a "take-over bid", as defined in the act, has been made, thus
creating a follow-up offer obligation; (2) in the absence of a
take-over bid, because of the lack of appropriate connecting factors
with Ontario, enforcement of the follow-up offer obligation as a
policy matter through the use, or threatened use, of cease trade
orders under section 123 of the act or denial of exemption orders
under section 124 of the act; and (3) a finding that a private
agreement purchase which does not constitute a take-over bid,
because, for example, of the purchase of less than twenty percent of
the voting shares, is inextricably bound or linked to a subsequent or
prior take-over bid, therefore requiring an equivalency of
consideration for the whole transaction.
Broad Interpretationof the Act: In Re Atco Ltd., 117 the commission
held that Atco was obligated to make a follow-up offer to the
minority shareholders of Canadian Utilities Limited (CU) in
Ontario, notwithstanding the fact that Atco had purchased shares of
CU from IU International Corporation (IU), whose address on the
books of CU was not in Ontario, in a private transaction which took
place in the United States or between the United States and Alberta.
Prior to the private transaction, Atco had made a take-over bid for
the shares of IU to Ontario shareholders, inter alia, in accordance
with the act for the express purpose of exchanging the acquired IU
shares for the CU shares owned by IU. The CU shares represented
approximately fifty-eight percent of the outstanding CU shares. The
rationale of the OSC for assuming jurisdiction was that Atco's offer
to the shareholders of IU was made in Ontario at a time when Atco
had an agreement with IU to exchange IU shares acquired under the
offer for shares of CU, so as to constitute an indirect offer by Atco
for CU, notwithstanding that there was no clear take-over bid under
the first branch of clause 88( 1)(k) of the act. 1 18 In a well-reasoned
residents that take place outside Ontario, then Ontario residents will structure their
deals to take place in other than Ontario. In either case, the laws of Ontario will
become meaningless..."
117. [1980] O.S.C.B. 412 (an application under clause 99(e) of the act for an
order exempting Atco from making a follow-up offer to the remaining shareholders
of the common shares of CU).
118. See, supra, at text accompanying note 94. The commission held that there
was a take-over bid, on the ground that CU was the "other issuer" in the phrase
"...to purchase ... indirectly voting securities of the company or other
issuer ..
" As pointed out by Commissioner Thom in his dissent, the "other
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dissent, Commissioner Thorn rejected the argument that the
transaction could come within subclause 88( 1)(k)(ii)" x9 , as follows:
The particular feature of subclause (ii), however, is that on its
face there need not be an association with Ontario such as
required by subclause (i). It was submitted, however, that in
situations where neither party to the transaction was incorporated
in, resided in or had an address in Ontario, the subclause would
nevertheless be invoked where there were Ontario holders of
securities of the offeree company.
I am unable to accept the foregoing argument. Had the
Legislature intended to enlarge the range of companies that might
become involved in a take-over bid beyond that stipulated in the
definition of the predecessor Act which is carried forward into
subclause i of clause k, the appropriate action would have been to
delete the words "the last address of any of whom as shown on
the books of the offeree company or other issuer is in Ontario" in
subclause i. A much more probable explanation of subclause ii is
that it was included to supplement subclause i. Without subclause
ii it would be possible for a company with a take-over intention to
avoid becoming involved in the complications affecting the
take-over bidder by arranging to have itself cast in the role of
receiving rather than making the offer.
With regard to take-over bids the policy of the Legislature of
Ontario has been to restrict the range of its legislation to cases in
which some at least of the offerees are within Ontario. This
policy was expressed in two definitional paragraphs in the
predecessor section 81, namely, clause c (now f), the definition
of "offeree" and clause g (now k(i)). Clause c was not amended
as would have been necessary had it been intended that under
clause k(ii) there could be a take-over bid between an 12offeree
and
0
an offeror neither of whom had an address in Ontario.
In Re Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec, 121 the
commission made permanent a temporary section 124 order,
denying certain exemptions, contained in the act, to the Caisse de
issuer" can only reasonably be interpreted to mean the other issuer referred to in
the earlier part of the definition, "...the last address of any of whom is shown in
the books of the offeree company or other issuer is in Ontario...." As
Commissioner Thom stated, supra, note 117 at pp. 426-427, "[t]he words other
issuer do no more than extend the take-over definition to apply to an issuer that is
not a company".
119. Supra, at text accompanying note 88.
120. Re Atco Ltd., supra, note 117 atpp. 428-429.
121. (1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 498C; a copy of the Order, issued under section 124, is
published in (1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 290B. No follow-up offer was involved in this
case.
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Depot et Placement du Quebec (the "Caisse") for its failure to file
insider trading reports and for an alleged illegal take-over bid for
Domtar Inc. The Caisse, a Quebec crown agency, together with
another Quebec crown agency, acquired some forty-two percent of
Domtar, primarily from institutions. One of the institutions from
which the Caisse purchased shares was Montreal Trust, which has
its head office in Quebec. The Caisse dealt with Montreal Trust in
Montreal, but Montreal Trust officers canvassed Ontario accounts
to locate Domtar shares, with the result that shares were acquired
from some Ontario accounts, the registered and beneficial owners of
whom were resident in Ontario. After having obtained the Domtar
shares from several accounts, Montreal Trust consolidated the
shares into one certificate, in its name, for transfer to the Caisse.
The OSC held that the registration in Montreal Trust's name was
transitory, so it could not be regarded as the "last address" of the
offerees, which had, until the consolidation, included some
Montreal Trust accounts in Ontario. Furthermore, the private
agreement exemption was held unavailable because of subclause
88(2)(c)(i). 1 22 While the Caisse argued that it had dealt with only
one party, Montreal Trust, the OSC held that more than fifteen
parties had been involved, as at least fifteen of these accounts were
found to be held in Ontario, and that, in tendering the Domtar shares
to the head office of Montreal Trust, the Ontario managers and
trustees were acting on behalf of the Ontario shareholders.
Notwithstanding that the Caisse had made an agreement with
Montreal Trust outside of Ontario, the substance of the transaction,
rather than its form, governed. Thus, the Caisse was held to have
made an illegal take-over bid to Ontario shareholders. In the
circumstances of the case, the decision of the OSC is justifiable,
since the Caisse appeared to be trying to do indirectly what it could
not do directly. The evidence established that the Ontario accounts
of Domtar shareholders, administered by Montreal Trust, were
solicited by the head office of Montreal Trust. Ontario Montreal
Trust managers acted on behalf of beneficial owners resident in
Ontario, and the head office of Montreal Trust acted, in effect, on
behalf of the Caisse.
In Re Electra Investments (Canada)Limited, 123 Electra acquired
approximately forty-seven percent of the outstanding common
122. Supra, text following note 90.
123. (1983), 6 O.S.C.B. 417; a copy of the Order, issued under sections 123 and
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shares of Energy and Precious Metals Inc. (EPM), a reporting issuer
under the act, whose shares were listed and traded on the Montreal
Exchange (ME). Electra had made its purchases of EPM shares
through the facilities of the ME, which is not a recognized
stock exchange for the purpose of an exempt stock exchange
take-over bid. Electra marginally exceeded the ME's normal
course purchase exemption of five percent in any month by
purchasing, on two occasions, slightly more than five percent of the
common shares of EPM in a thirty-day period from residents of
Ontario who sold through the ME. The OSC decided that the cease
trading order should remain in force, but that a denial of exemptions
by a section 124 order under the act was inappropriate because the
case should have been the subject of proceedings to obtain a
compliance order, pursuant to section 122 of the act, to require
compliance with the take-over bid requirements of the act. The OSC
held that there was a take-over bid made from Ontario, by an
Ontario resident, to Ontario registered shareholders, albeit through
the facilities of the ME. The OSC stated that "[tihe legal question
is an important one since it will determine whether the provisions
for [sic] the Act could be circumvented

. . .

by listing the securities

on an Exchange outside of Ontario or arranging for the offer to be
made and accepted outside of Ontario.' '1 24 The commission also
suggested that the act should be amended to permit any shareholder,
upon obtaining the consent of the OSC, direct access to the courts
under section 122 of the act.
In the Humboldt' 2 5 case, the commission appears to have decided
to reverse somewhat the broad jurisdictional bases it had claimed in
such cases as Atco1 2 6 and Electra,127 and it required that there
clearly be a take-over bid, as defined in the act, in order for there to
be a follow-up offer requirement. In this case, Humboldt Energy
Corporation, a British Columbia corporation and a reporting issuer
under the act, entered into an agreement with a Swiss corporation to
purchase about 2.5 percent of the issued and outstanding common
shares of an Alberta corporation, also a reporting issuer under the
act, whose common shares were listed on the Vancouver and
124, is published in (1983), 5 O.S.C.B. 9B. No follow-up offer was involved in
this case.
124. Supra, note 123, 6 O.S.C.B. 417, at p. 420.
125. Re Humboldt Energy Corporation(1983), 5 O.S.C.B. 8C.
126. Supra, note 117.
127. Supra, note 123.
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Alberta stock exchanges at a price in excess of 15 percent of the
market price. The address of the Swiss corporation, as it appeared
on the books of the offeree corporation, was outside of Ontario.
Approximately 33 percent of the offeree corporation's issued and
outstanding capital was held by Ontario shareholders. The
acquisition by Humboldt, together with the holdings of its
controlling shareholder, would have exceeded the take-over bid
threshhold of 20 percent under the act.
The commission stated that there was no "take-over bid", since
the address of the Swiss corporation on the books of the offeree
corporation was outside of Ontario and, therefore, the commission
had no jurisdiction to give an exempting order under clause 99(e) of
the act. The commission also stated that, in the circumstances of the
case, it would not exercise any of its powers, including those under
section 124, in order to compel Humboldt to make a follow-up offer
to the offeree corporation's shareholders in Ontario. Although the
commission said that it would not exercise its powers, including
those under section 124, to compel a follow-up offer, it did state
that it was in the process of developing guidelines of the
circumstances in which it would consider exercising its powers in
the act. In addition, it seemed to indicate that it was still of the view
that it had a broad jurisdiction that might transcend provincial
borders to force a follow-up offer, by stating that "[t]he
Commission noted that private agreements, the terms of which, or
the circumstances of execution of which, might be regarded as
abusive to minority shareholders or as having a negative impact on
the capital markets, could constitute the basis for Commission
28
intervention." 1
Enforcement as a Policy Matter: The OSC has forced follow-up
offers and other provisions of the act in situations where issuers
were not subject to the specific provisions of the act, on the ground
that issuers that use Ontario capital markets, by reason of their
listing on the TSE, or otherwise, should abide by the spirit of
Ontario law. The OSC has pressured issuers to comply with the
follow-up offer obligation, in cases where it may not be legally
required, by exercising its powers to issue cease trading orders and
orders denying exemptions in the act against the issuers and their
officers and directors. 12 9 This policy was articulated in Re
128. Re Humboldt Energy Corporation,supra, note 125 at p. 9C.
129. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, ss. 123 and 124.
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CablecastingLimited, 130 where the commission stated that it would

exercise its cease trading powers not only where a proposed
transaction contravened a statute, such as the Business Corporations
Act,1 31 even where other remedies were available under that statute,
but also where a transaction ". . .while consistent with the
language of prior policy rulings and statements of the Commission,
would contravene the intent of these rulings and statements and
detractfrom the credibility of the capital markets or be otherwise
132
inconsistentwith the best interests of investors."
In Re Kaiser Resources Limited, 133 the OSC found that the

exercise of certain stock options by employees of Kaiser Resources
Limited, a British Columbia corporation and a reporting issuer by
virtue of its TSE listing, would have resulted in the breach of the
insider trading provisions of the act. 134 Notwithstanding that the
employees resided in British Columbia and the entire exercise of the
options took place outside Ontario, the OSC asserted that it had
jurisdiction, under section 124 of the act, to deprive the employees
of trading exemptions available under section 34 of the act:
It is. . .our view that activity by a person of the type prohibited
by section 75, wherever such activity takes place, may properly

form the basis for determination by the Commission pursuant to
section 124 of the Act that it is in the public interest of this
Province to deny that person the benefit of the exemptions
contained in section 34 of the Act. This is by no means to attempt
to give an extra-territorialeffect to the Act. Rather, it is an

assertion by the Commission of its jurisdiction and responsibility
to determine the sorts of activity which should disentitle persons
from trading, or restrict their ability to trade, in securities in this
province. In so doing, the Commission is doing no more than
carrying out its statutory35 obligation to supervise the capital
markets of this Province. 1
In Re Universal Explorations Ltd.,

136

the OSC issued various

interim orders, under subsection 22(2), and sections 123 and 124 of
130. [1978] O.S.C.B. 37.

131. R.S.O. 1980, c.54 as am.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Re CablecastingLimited, supra, note 130 at p. 41 (emphasis added).
(1981), 1 O.S.C.B. 13C.
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.466, s.75.
Re Kaiser Resources Limited, supra, note 133 at p. 16C (emphasis added).

136. (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 33D (temporary cease trading order to prevent
subsequent amalgamation); (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 52D (extension of temporary order
denying exemptions); Re Universal Explorations(81) Ltd. (1981), 20.S.C.B. 55D

(extension of temporary cease trading order); (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 57D (temporary
denial ofexemptions); (1981), 2 O.S.C.B. 59D (Notice of Hearing).
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the act, in order to prevent an amalgamation of two Alberta
corporations, Universal Explorations Ltd. and the Petrol & Gas
Company Limited, notwithstanding that the amalgamation was
subject to Alberta court approval. The order was issued as the
amalgamation agreement might not have provided the remaining
Petrol shareholders with the equivalent consideration as that paid by
Universal for the control block of Petrol, pursuant to a private
agreement from a Petrol shareholder resident outside of Ontario.
Although the shares of the parties to the private agreement in which
Universal acquired a control block in Petrol had never traded in
Ontario, it appeared that the OSC was trying to force a follow-up
offer to the remaining Petrol shareholders, on the ground that Petrol
had been listed on the TSE for many years, there were some
minority Petrol shareholders resident in Ontario, and, in announcing
the proposed amalgamation of Universal and Petrol, Universal had
issued a press release stating that it would make a follow-up offer to
the minority Petrol shareholders.' 3 7 The amalgamation agreement
provided that minority Petrol shareholders would receive shares in
the amalgamated corporation, which shares were to be listed on the
TSE. The OSC's apparent rationale for claiming jurisdiction to
issue its various interim orders was the fact that Universal would be
using the Ontario capital markets to effect an amalgamation without
making a follow-up offer.
The dissentient Petrol shareholders argued that the Alberta courts
should not approve the transaction, as the OSC intervention might
prevent a listing of the shares on the TSE. The Alberta court
rejected this argument, stating that:
[The] last ground of objection had to do with the position of the
Ontario Securities Commission and the resulting impact on
trading shares in Ontario, plus the use of the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Frankly I consider this argument to be somewhat of a
red herring in the context of this application. Universal and Petrol
are both incorporated under the Alberta Companies Act and
headquartered in Alberta. This application is under the Alberta
Companies Act. [The transaction is a share exchange and
amalgamation.] There is a substantial legal question as to
whether this method of conversion constitutes a "trade" in
shares under the Ontario Securities Act, for it is only when a
trade occurs in Ontario that the Ontario Securities Commission
obtains any jurisdiction over the matter. It is probably true that if

137. See, infra, note 138, 16 B.L.R. atp. 191.
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the new company wants to subsequently trade in Ontario, it will
have to satisfy the Ontario Securities Commission that the
proposal meets the Ontario criteria for a follow-up offer, but that
is something that will
have to be decided in the future by the
38
Ontario authorities. 1
In Universal, Universal's press release, stating that it would
make a follow-up offer to minority shareholders, implicitly became
a ground for the assumption of jurisdiction by the OSC. 139 In Re
Turbo Resources Limited, 140 the OSC had occasion, once again, to
consider the import of an undertaking to make a follow-up offer. On
June 24, 1981, Turbo Resources Limited agreed to purchase, for
$13-1/8 per share, about twenty-eight percent of the common shares
of Merland Explorations Limited, which was owned by a company
in the British Virgin Islands. A private agreement transaction was
completed on July 3, 1981, outside of Ontario. This transaction did
not constitute a take-over bid, as the address of the offeree
shareholder was outside of Ontario. On June 27, 1981, the TSE
accepted a notice of an offer by Turbo to make a stock exchange bid
to acquire, through the TSE and the ME, a further twenty-seven
percent of the Merland common shares for the same consideration
per share as was paid under the private agreement. 14 1 The stock
exchange bid was exempt from Part XIX of the act, other than
subsection 91(1), pursuant to clause 88(2)(a). However, subsection
91(1) refers to "reliance on the exemption in clause 88(2)(c)", or
138. Re Universal ExplorationsLtd. and Petrol Oil and Gas Co. Ltd. (1982), 16
B.L.R. 186 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 213-214; revd., on other grounds, Harris v.
Universal Explorations Ltd. (1982), 17 B.L.R. 135 (Alta. C.A.) (approval for
amalgamation denied on the ground of deficient disclosure in the information
circular).

139. Supra, text at note 137.
140. (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 14B (OSC order extending time for Turbo to make its
follow-up offer); (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 67C (reasons for first Bankeno Mines
Limited offer); (1982), 3 O.S.C.B 57C (decision concerning second Bankeno
offer); (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 104C (reasons for decision for second Bankeno
amended offer); (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 65C (decision for July 9-10, 1981 hearing).
See also (1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 403C (denial of exemptions pursuant to s.124);
(1982), 3 0.S.C.B. 55C (Div. Ct.) (dismissal of application for an order of
prohibition), (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 132C (C.A.) (dismissal of application to extend
time period for appeal from Div. Ct. order); Re Turbo Resources Ltd. and Maison
Placements CanadaInc. (1982), 137 D.L.R. (3d) 264 (Ont. Div. Ct.), (1982), 19
B.L.R. 309; affg. (sub. nom. OntarioSecurities Commission v. Turbo Resources

Limited) (1982), 3 0.S.C.B. 98C (H.C.J.) (granting of compliance order under
s. 122) and affg. (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 67C and 104C (decisions of OSC on first and
second Bankeno valuation hearings).
141. TSE Notice to Members No. 3307, June 29, 1981.
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the private agreement exemption, and does not include a reference
to clause 88(2)(a). It would thus appear that a follow-up offer was
not legally required as a result of the stock exchange bid.
The OSC held a hearing at the behest of Ontario Merland
common shareholders who wanted the commission to order a
follow-up offer. The commission did not order a follow-up offer
under subsection 91(1) at that time, as it relied on an undertaking of
Turbo to make a follow-up offer and requested that Turbo confirm
its undertaking publicly. On July 8, 1981, Turbo announced what it
termed a "clarifying statement" to the stock exchange bid, stating
that, before December 29, 1981, it would effect or cause to be
effected a transaction which would provide to the remaining
shareholders of Merland the opportunity to receive a consideration
per common share that was at least equal in value to $13-1/8.142
The OSC did not make any order in July 1981, requiring Turbo to
make a follow-up offer. Rather, it relied on the undertaking, and, in
March 1982, when the offer was not forthcoming, it purported to
give a written decision for the July hearing, claiming it had made an
43
order requiring a follow-up offer. 1
In March 1982, the OSC applied for a compliance order under
section 122. Mr. Justice Osler stated that:
After a hearing on July 9th and 10th the Commission made a
decision not to prohibit the completion of the bid and an essential
and integral part of that decision was the fact that the
Commission received from counsel for the respondent, openly at
its hearing and in the presence of the chairman, other officers and
several directors of the respondent, an unconditional undertaking
respecting the remaining shareholders. That undertaking in its
essential part was that Turbo would effect or cause to be effected
a transaction on or before December 29, 1981, which would
provide to Canadian resident shareholders of Merland the
opportunity to receive [$13-1/8] net of commissions per common
share. That was 4the
price at which the open stock exchange bids
4
had been made. 1
On appeal to the Divisional Court, Mr. Justice Southey said that:
The Stock Exchange offer was for approximately 27% of the
shares of Merland and was clearly a take-over bid under Part
XIX .

.

. It was exempted from the requirements of Part XIX

142. TSE Notice to Members No. 3318, July 9, 1981.
143. Re Turbo Resources Limited (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 65C.
144. Re Ontario Securities Commission and Turbo (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 98C

(H.C.J.) at pp. 100C-101C.
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other than s-s. 1 of s.91 by s.88(2)(a), because it was made
through the facilities of a stock exchange recognized by the
commission ...
Under s. 124 of the Securities Act the commission had the
power "where in its opinion such action is in the public interest"
to order that any or all of the exemptions contained in s.88 do not
apply to a person named in the order. It was therefore open to the
commission if, in its opinion, it was in the public interest to do
so, to remove from Turbo the exemption under Part XIX relating
to its take-over bid made through the Stock Exchange.
The result of the removal of such exemption would have been
to cause Turbo to be bound by s.91(3) ...
If s.91(3) had been made applicable to the take-over bid, it
would have required Turbo to pay for all stock of Merland the
cash consideration of $13 1/8 that it was paying under the Stock
Exchange offer. But it then would have been open to the
commission

. . .

to have modified the requirement imposed

upon Turbo under s.91(3) by virtue of the powers given to the
commission by s.99 of the Act. The commission could thereby
have ordered Turbo to make a follow-up offer with a
consideration at least equal in value to that originally paid, in
accordance with s.91(1) in lieu of paying the same consideration
as required by s.91(3). Such order would have required Turbo to
do substantially the same thing as it has undertaken to do in its
undertaking to the commission, and it seems reasonable to infer
that the commission did not make any such order at the time of
the July hearing
because of the undertaking that had been given
45
by Turbo. 1
The court did not express a view as to whether the OSC was
correct in its opinion that subsection 91(1) was applicable to
Turbo. 146 However, Turbo had applied for an extension in
December 1981, and the commission order, granting the requested
14 7
exemption, stated that Turbo was subject to subsection 91(1).
Mr. Justice Southey stated that:
Just as the commission for the reasons given above could have
ordered Turbo at the July hearing to make an offer under s.91(l),
it also had jurisdiction in December, for the same reasons to
make the order contained in the proviso in para. I that Turbo

145. Re Turbo Resources Ltd. and Maison Placements Canada Inc. (1982), 137
D.L.R. (3d) 264 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at pp.270-271; (1982), 19 B.L.R. 309 at pp.
316-317.
146. Ibid, D.L.R. atp. 271, B.L.R. atp. 318.
147. (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 14B (para. I of the Order reads, in part, "the Offer
pursuant to Section 91(1) of the Act shall be completed...").
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complete the offer under s.91(l) of the Act. The order there
made, in our judgment, was an order with which compliance
48
could be directed by a decision of a High Court judge. '
In Turbo, there was clearly no take-over bid in the private
agreement transaction, because the offeree shareholder's address on
the books of Merland was outside of Ontario. With respect to the
stock exchange bid, the transaction was exempt from the
requirements of Part XIX, other than subsection 91(1), by clause
88(2)(a). Subsection 91(1), however, becomes operative only
where there is "reliance on the exemption in clause 88(2)(c)". A
stock exchange bid is thus exempt from the follow-up offer
obligation. An undertaking may provide shareholders with a
contractual right of action, particularly where they tender pursuant
to a stock exchange bid in reliance on the undertaking, but there
does not appear to be any jurisdictional ground for the commission
to mandate a follow-up offer on the basis of an undertaking. If
Turbo had appealed the OSC extension order of December 1981, it
might have done so with success.
It should not seem surprising that a stock exchange bid is exempt
from the follow-up offer requirement of subsection 91(1). Except
with respect to normal course purchases where a premium over
market cannot be involved, such a bid is made pursuant to the rules
of the exchange, with advance notice to all shareholders who have
the right to participate in the acceptances of the offer so the mischief
of the private agreement exemption is not present.
The Linked Bid: In February 1981, an OSC Notice stated that it
might be contrary to the public interest for an offeror to acquire all
of the holdings of certain shareholders through private agreements,
and thereafter, in a "linked transaction", to offer for only part of
the publicly-held shares. 14 9 In April 1981, the OSC issued an
addendum to Interim Policy 3-37 which specifically refers to linked
or integrated transactions:
The Commission has been concerned that notwithstanding the
intent of Part XIX of the Act, in some situations, holders of large
blocks of shares may be or perceived to be treated better than the
holders of smaller numbers of shares by the offeror in the context
of a take-over bid or the issuer in the context of an issuer bid. It is

148. Supra, note 145, D.L.R. at p. 272, B.L.R. atp. 319.
149. Notices "Take-over Bids - Private Contracts - Partial Bids" (1982),
O.S.C.B. 6A.

1

140 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the policy of the Act [see section 91(3)] that all shareholders
should be treated equally. Of concern particularly are partial
take-over bids or issuer bids following or at the same time as
private agreements for the purchase of0all of the securities of the
class sought from a particular holder. 15
For the purpose of subsection 91(3) of the act, the OSC has stated
. .it is the view of the Commission that offering to purchase
all the securities of a class of any holder pursuant to a private
agreement will require that if the purchaser makes a linked or
related take-over bid or issuer bid for the securities of that class, it
must be made for all of the class of securities sought at a price at
least as great as that paid in the private agreement."151 With respect
to private agreement purchases prior to making a take-over bid, the
OSC stated that:
If such private agreements constitute a take-over bid exempted
from the requirements of Part XIX by clause 88(2)(c) and a
follow-up offer is required pursuant to section 91(1), there
appears to be no problem. But where the private agreements do
not constitute a take-over bid or where it is exempted under
88(2)(c) and no follow-up offer is required to be made, the
Commission is concerned for the equal treatment of the
remaining shareholders during the subsequent take-over bid. It is
the view of the Commission that when such private agreements
are entered into by a purchaser with the intention of making a
take-over bid at a later date, they should be considered in
determining whether the same consideration is being offered to
all holders of the same class of securities for the purpose of
section 91(3). For this purpose, the Commission will presume
that this intention existed at the time of the private agreement
where the announcement of the take-over bid is made within 180
days of the date of the private agreement. This presumption may
be rebutted upon an application under section 99.152
that ".

150. Addendum to Draft [Interim] Policy No. 3-37, "Private Agreements Prior To
or During a Take-Over Bid or Issuer Bid" (1981), 1 O.S.C.B. 24E. A draft or
interim policy may take effect from the date of its implementation with notice to the
public that the policy may be modified to reflect comments received during the
draft or interim period. See Request for Comments (1981), 1 0.S.C.B. at p. 25E.
The addendum to the draft policy was essentially adopted by the OSC as Policy
9.3B. "Private Agreement Prior to a Take-over Bid or Issuer Bid - Linked
Transactions" (1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 551 E, 2 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.
54-962.
151. Policy 9.3B., supra, note 150, O.S.C.B. at p. 552E, para. 2, 2 Can. Sec. L.
Rep. at para. 54-962, para. 2.
152. Ibid, O.S.C.B. at para. 3, 2 Can. Sec. L. Rep. at para. 3.
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In Re Trans Mountain Pipeline Company Ltd., 153 the commission issued a cease trade order against a bid by Inland National Gas
Co. Ltd. for Trans Mountain Pipeline Company Ltd., an act which
is illustrative of the problems inherent in Policy 9.3B. Inland had
purchased a block of Trans Mountain shares in a private transaction
from Sovereign Life Assurance Company, whose address, on the
books of Trans Mountain, was outside Ontario. The shares were
purchased at a cash price of $9.04 per share prior to making, but
after announcing, a take-over bid for Trans Mountain offering three
Inland shares for five Trans Mountain shares. At a hearing in
December 1982, the commission decided that if Inland were to
proceed with its offer, it would not be required to offer cash of
$9.04 per share. However, the commission held that the purchase
from Sovereign was a "linked transaction" with the take-over bid,
and it decided to cease trade the Inland bid until Inland offered
paper of a value at least equivalent to $9.04 per share for each Trans
Mountain share and sent two valuations of the consideration offered
by the Inland take-over bid circular to Trans Mountain shareholders
to substantiate the equivalency. Subsection 91(3) was held
applicable, notwithstanding that the purchase from Sovereign was
not a take-over bid. This interpretation of subsection 91(3) is, in
effect, an assumption of jurisdiction by the OSC for transactions not
legally subject to the act which have taken place outside of Ontario.
The result of the order of the OSC in this case, from the point of
view of the shareholders of Trans Mountain, was that the
shareholders were to receive an offer of a value of at least $9.04 per
share or, if Inland elected not to continue with its offer, no offer

whatsoever. 154

153. (1982), 40.S.C.B. 552C; a copy of the Order, issued under ss. 123 and 140,
is published at p. 376B.
154. Inland subsequently continued with its offer, supported by two valuations that
its offer was worth at least $9.04 per share. Trans Mountain challenged these
valuations with two valuations of its own, which opined that the Inland offer was
not worth $9.04 per share. After two days of hearings on the valuation question in
January, 1983 (Re Trans Mountain Pipeline Company Ltd. (1983), 5 O.S.C.B.
5C), the commission, now differently constituted since Messrs. Knowles and Bray
had ceased to hold office, decided to let the Trans Mountain shareholders determine
for themselves whether or not they wanted to accept the Inland offer, regardless of

whether it was worth $9.04 per share. As a result, the commission decided not to
judge the differing valuations, but issued an exempting order, under section 99(e)
of the act, permitting the offer to proceed, on the ground that to do so would not be
contrary to the public interest.
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The OSC has also considered the linked bid or intregration
concept with respect to purchases after a take-over bid. In the
Genstar case, 15 5 Genstar Corporation had made a bid for Canada
Permanent Mortgage Corporation shares which expired on July 31,
1981, at a price per common share of $31.00 and a price of $36.90
per convertible series A shares. As a result of the bid, Genstar had
acquired thirty-nine percent of the common shares on a fully
converted basis. On August 10, 1981, Genstar purchased from its
former adversary, First City Financial Corporation Ltd., all of First
City's common shares of Canada Permanent for a price of $35.00
per common share and $41.65 per preference share. The
commission reviewed the bids to ascertain whether the Genstar-First
City agreement should be regarded as linked or integrally related in
law, with the result that Genstar would be in breach of subsection
89(3) of the act. Subsection 89(3) provides that, where an offeror
during the course of a take-over bid pays or agrees to pay a price for
securities higher than the consideration offered through the bid, the
take-over bid "shall be deemed to be varied by increasing the
consideration to the higher price." The commission held that, since
Genstar had decided to purchase First City shares only after the bid,
the essential element of an integrated transaction was absent.
(ii) General Considerations
The legal question of the extraterritorial application of the act does
not appear to have been the subject of judicial consideration.
However, it is a general principle of Canadian law that provinces
cannot legislate with extraterritorial effect. As stated in Laskin's
CanadianConstitutionalLaw:
Section 3 of the Statute of Westminster . . . expressly authorized
Parliament to legislate with extraterritorial effect ...
The terms of the Statute of Westminster, however, spoke
expressly of "the Parliament of a Dominion", thus leaving
unchanged the position of the Canadian provinces as well as of
the Australian states. The beginning words of s.92 B.N.A. Act,
reinforced by similar expressions internally for the listed classes
of subjects therein and by like language in other section, e.g.
Education, s.93, Agriculture, s.95, make it very plain that
conduct beyond the borders of
a province lies outside of
56
provincial authority to regulate. 1
155. Re Genstar Corporation (1982), 40.S.C.B. 326C, (1982), 20 B.L.R. 72.
156. Abel, Albert S., Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law (4th Ed. Toronto:
The Carswell Company Ltd., 1973) p. 408.
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Ainsman and Hogg have commented that ". . .a province's
jurisdiction is limited to persons, property or activities within its
borders. . .the existence of some element in the province will not
necessarily be sufficient to support regulatory legislation that
modifies rights outside the province or that creates extra-territorial

duties.'

'157

The case law dealing with extraterritorial application of
provincial legislation is generally concerned with the question of
whether a particular provincial statute, the validity of which has
been challenged, in fact operates so as to have extraterritorial effect.
An examination of these cases indicates the apparent existence of a
presumption against the extraterritorial application of provincial
legislation: the courts will endeavour to interprete provincial laws so
that they will not have extraterritorial application and, thus, will be
within the power of a province.' 58 A finding of statutory
interference with extraprovincial rights generally results in courts
declaring the legislation ultra vires as far as any extraterritorial
application is concerned. 159 With respect to the commission's broad
interpretation of its jurisdiction to mandate a follow-up offer
obligation, the question is whether the commission's action in so
doing involves destruction or modification of a civil or contractual
right existing outside of the province of Ontario. In seeking to
impose a follow-up offer obligation on a party to a private
agreement where rights have been created outside of the province, it
may be that the OSC is effectively modifying the rights of the
affected party under the private agreement. In these circumstances,
the courts might well find that the commission, in broadly
interpreting the act, was giving it an extraterritorial application, and
that the act should not be so interpreted.
The principle stated by the OSC in Kaiser' 60 can be summarized
on the basis that the conduct described in that case, which, if
committed in Ontario, would have violated section 75 of the act, is
improper, and that the OSC, in carrying out its statutory obligation

157. Supra, note 98 at p. 147.
158. See, for example, Royal Bank of Canada v. The King, [1913] A.C. 283
(P.C.);CreditFoncier v. Ross, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 365 (Alta. S.C. A.D.).
159. Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada (The Carswell Company
Limited: Toronto, 1977) pp. 207-211. See also Commentary, Do Unto Others: The
ExtraterritorialReach of RegulatoryLegislation in Canada(1980), 5 Can. Bus. L.
J. 114 at p. 126.
160. Supra, note 133.
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to supervise the capital markets of Ontario, is entitled to deprive
persons who engage in such improper conduct from trading in
Ontario. Whether or not, as a matter of law, this principle is correct,
it does not follow that the principle should be made applicable to
create a follow-up offer obligation. It is difficult to argue that the
obligation should apply to a transaction taking place in a jurisdiction
which does not have a similar requirement. Until the commission
16 1
publishes the proposed guidelines referred to in Humboldt,
however, uncertainty will remain as to the commission's view of its
jurisdiction to exercise its powers in order to require a follow-up
offer, notwithstanding that there may be no clear jurisdictional
nexus under the act for a follow-up offer.
On the one hand, it can be argued that the commission has a
broad jurisdictional basis to cease trade or remove exemptions under
sections 123 and 124, as the powers thereunder are based on its
opinion that action is required in the public interest. On this ground,
it can be argued that the commission can exercise its powers to force
a follow-up offer, notwithstanding that there is no take-over bid
under the act, if, in its view of the public interest, a follow-up offer
is required, due to the offeree corporation having Ontario
shareholders or the offeree being a reporting issuer in Ontario or
otherwise. On the other hand, it can be argued that, where the
legislature has specifically provided in the act that a follow-up offer
is only to be required where there is a take-over bid, as defined in
the act, the commission should not exercise its powers to force a
follow-up offer in circumstances where there is no take-over bid.
Under this view, the language in sections 123 and 124 would have
to be read in such a way as to make it consistent with the provisions
of Part XIX of the act, and perhaps more generally in order to take
account of the constitutional limitations of the province, so as to
ensure no unlawful extraterritorial application of the act. The better
view would appear to be that the commission should not exercise its
powers under sections 123 or 124 where there is clearly no
take-over bid in Ontario, since the legislature has expressed the
circumstances in which the follow-up offer is to apply. Moreover,
the purported exercise of its jurisdiction over transactions which
legitimately take place beyond the borders of the province is
constitutionally unsound. If the act were amended so that all
take-over bids would be subject to Ontario law where the offeree
161. Supra, note 128.
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corporation was a reporting issuer, it might be that the commission
would have a broader power to intervene in order to protect
shareholders of a reporting issuer. The reporting issuer jurisdictional base is already utilized in the act in such areas as insider
trading, set out in Part XX, and in the proxy solicitation provisions,
set out in Part XVIII.
In Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon,16 2 it was held that the
insider trading provisions of the act were intra vires and could
operate concurrently with similar provisions under federal law. If
the reporting issuer concept was utilized as the jurisdictional ground
for take-over bids, it could arguably allow broader grounds for a
follow-up offer to be mandated and could presumably operate
concurrently with federal legislation in this area. On the other hand,
it might be argued that such an amendment to the take-over bid
definition under the Ontario Act would be ultra vires the province
by forcing a follow-up offer where a corporate transaction takes
place outside of the province.
(b) The Application of the Exempting Power
The formulation of a policy setting forth guidelines which indicate
the grounds upon which the commission would be favourably
disposed to grant an exemption from the follow-up offer obligation
proved difficult.16 3 The first application for an exemption from the
follow-up offer obligation was heard by the commission after the
departure of the chairman who had been responsible for Policy
3-41.164 In Re Ronalds-Federated Limited, 165 the commission
brought into question the whole import of the policy by denying the
application for an exemption, notwithstanding that the commission
had difficulty fitting the transaction within the ambit of three
categories which it had stated would militate against granting an
exemption. The commission decided to place the transaction within
the first of the three categories as "unfair or abusive", rejecting
arguments that the transaction should be exempt because the
premium over "market" which triggered the follow-up offer
obligation was an insignificant amount. The OSC held that the
162. Supra, note 13.
163. Report of the Vice-Chairman, OSC Weekly Summary 27, June 180 1A at p.
3A; See also Willis, Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect (1974), 24 U.
Toronto L.J. 225 at pp. 236-237.
164. Mr. J. C. Baillie.
165. [1980] O.S.C.B. 304.
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special facts of the case, particularly the "very recent trading
history, the relatively small float of Ronalds shares, the consequent
thinness of the actual trading, the substantial premium that $30.00
represents over the trading price in the very recent past, and the
price at which Ronalds Federated increased its control position
through the TSE as recently as twelve months ago", made the
transaction unfair to minority shareholders. 16 6 Although the
commission stated that the issue was not one of the amount of the
excess premium paid over the market price, the amount of the
premium was given as a reason for denying the application. The
OSC concluded that the case ". . .illustrates that a general policy
67
statement such as 3-41. . .cannot cover all possible situations."1
In Atco, the vice-chairman stated that "OSC Policy 3-41,
published prior to the coming into force of the Act in an attempt to
give some guidance in a very vexing area, has taken on a life of its
own in the eyes of some readers beyond that which at least some
members of the Commission anticipated."1 68 The granting of an
exemption in Atco, notwithstanding that the transaction contained
some elements which could be construed as being unfair in the
context of Ronalds-Federated,created uncertainty as to the criteria
which the OSC would consider important in the exercise of its
discretionary powers to grant exemptions. In particular, the
transaction appeared abusive and unfair because IU had acted on the
basis of what was best for it as a majority shareholder, and had done
so by rejecting the proposed take-over bid at a slightly lower price to
all of the offeree corporation's shareholders so that it could obtain a
69
greater price in a private transaction. 1
The commission had stated in Ronalds-Federatedthat the size of
the premium should be irrelevant, but in Atco this factor was taken
into account, as follows: "The excess premium being paid is not on
its face so large as to be clearly unfair or abusive to the other
shareholders and the other factors present also do not indicate that
the transaction is clearly unfair or abusive. ",170 It also appears that
the fact that control of a major Canadian company was being
repatriated to Canadian hands had some effect, although this issue
was questioned by counsel for the minority shareholders, who asked
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Ibid, p. 314.
Ibid.
Supra, note ll7atp. 424.
Ibid, atp. 422.
Ibid.
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"how a payment of some $320 million to a United States
corporation could be in Canada's best national interest.' 1 7 1 In
another decision, namely, Re Sands Oil & Gas Exploration
Limited, 172 in which the commission granted an exemption, the
applicant represented that it proposed to convert inactive corporations into active concerns for the probable benefit of the
shareholders. The application was granted without reasons for the
decision and, therefore, without reference to Ronalds-Federated.
Guideline (e) of Policy 3-41 suggested that an exemption might
be granted, under clause 99(e) of the act, from the follow-up offer
obligation "[i]f the 'offeror' makes available to the other security
holders the consideration required by section 9 1(1) by means that do
not technically qualify as an offer . .

"173

In Sklar, 1 74 PCL

Industries Limited proposed that it make a premium payment to
"top up" the market value of the Sklar Manufacturing Limited
common shares in order to give a shareholder a package of
securities which would have a value, taken together with the
common share itself, that was equal to the consideration paid under
the private agreement. The shareholder would be topped up from
the market value without his shares actually being acquired. The
commission noted that the topping-up proposal had merit, since
"...one of the undesirable consequences of fulfilling the
'follow-up offer' obligation is the removal of the subject securities
of the charter company from the range of securities available to the
public.' 1 75 The commission stated that it would consider a
topping-up proposal, "carried forward on a timely basis", as an
adequate ground to grant an exemption from the follow-up offer
obligation under clause 99(e) if certain circumstances existed.
These circumstances were that:
(a) the intention to make a "topping-up" distribution is publicly
announced on the day the private agreement is made and
announced,
(b) the market for the target securities at the time of such
announcement was not "affected by an anticipated take-over bid
or by improper manipulation" [section 99(b)],
171. lbid, at p. 421.
172. (1981), 20.S.C.B. 188B.

173. Supra, note 107 at pp. 239-240.
174. Re PCL IndustriesLimited/Sklar Manufacturing Limited (1982), 4 O.S.C.B.
27C. See also Re Sklar Manufacturing Limited, infra, note 200.
175. PCL/Sklar, supra, note 174 at p. 31C.
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(c) the "topping-up" distribution clearly has the same "value"
as the premium paid under the private agreement, e.g.
(i) cash, where the seller under the private agreement receives
cash, or
(ii) the same securities as received by the seller under the
private agreement where the seller receives securities, and
(d) the "topping-up" distribution is made at the same time as, or
within five to ten business
days from, the date of payment under
76
the private agreement. '
Presumably, the restriction that the offer be made within five to ten
business days was imposed so that the question of value would be
easier to determine. We think that such a limited period of time may
unduly restrict the use of topping-up proposals. The process of
topping-up should be available if made within the statutory period
of time for the follow-up offer, which, at present, is 180 days, with
the value being determined by the OSC if it appears that the total
value is not at least equivalent to the consideration paid under the
private agreement.
The commission cast doubt on the effect and import of Policy
3-41, but allowed it to stand as the commission's statement of the
grounds on which it would exercise its discretion in granting
exemptions, while giving it perfunctory or no consideration in later
cases. 17 7 It is regrettable that the commission did not readdress the
policy issues in order to revise Policy 3-41 when it became apparent
from the result of the first decision in Ronalds-Federatedthat the
policy would not be applied by the commission. This fact was not
formally recognized until the end of 1982, when the policy was
78
deleted from the OSC Policy statements.'
(c) Non-Acquisition of Effective Control
The act assumes that control is acquired when the twenty percent
threshhold is achieved, but provides that this assumption can be
rebutted under a clause 99(a) application, where the OSC
determines that an offeror will not or did not acquire the power or
authority to control the business or affairs of an offeree company as
176. lbid, pp. 32C-33C.
177. See, for example, PCLISklar, supra, note 174.
178. Policy 9.2 "Take-over Bids - Section 99 Applications for Exemptions from
the Obligations [sic] to Make A Follow-up Offer" (1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 550E, 2
Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 54-961.
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a result of the take-over bid.' 79 In Policy 3-41, the OSC stated that
substantial weight would be given to whether the offeror would, as a
consequence of the private agreement transactions, acquire the
practical authority to nominate (and presumably elect) a majority of
the directors. 180 This exemption is a logical one within the context
of the policy for the follow-up offer: where the offeror has not in
fact paid a premium to acquire control, the offeror should not be
obliged to make an offer to all shareholders.
Although clause 99(a) is expressed in the act as a separate ground
for granting an exemption, the former chairman of the commission
indicated in Re DatalineInc. 18 1 that it should consider clause 99(e)
in tandum with clause 99(a). On this basis, once the commission has
made a determination under clause 99(a) that is favourable to an
offeror, it would then further consider whether an exemption would
not also be prejudicial to the public interest. This raises the issue of
whether it was intended that the follow-up obligation would only
apply where control, de facto or legal, is being acquired or whether
it was intended that, in any case where a private agreement
exemption is being utilized to exempt a take-over bid and a
premium in excess of fifteen percent is involved, the act was
intended to apply. We believe that a good argument can be made for
the position that the follow-up obligation was, as a general rule,
intended to apply only when the acquisition of control is involved.
Since it is very often difficult to judge whether control is in fact
being acquired, the technique used was to provide that a take-over
bid at the required premium would trigger the operation of
subsection 91(3), but that the commission would have power to
exempt where it is satisfied that the offeror has not or will not
acquire control.
Noranda Mines Limited and Alberta Energy Company Limited
(AEC) applied to the OSC under clauses 99(a) and (e) when
Noranda sold its block of twenty-eight percent of British Columbia
Forest Products Limited (BCFP) outstanding common shares to
AEC.1 82 The applicants submitted that effective control of BCFP
179. See text accompanying note 100, supra.
180. Supra, note 107 atp. 236.
181. (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 48C, at pp. 52C-53C.
182. Re British Columbia Forest Products Limited (Part H) (1981), 2 O.S.C.B.
6C; Order (1981), 1 O.S.C.B. 177B. The OSC had previously determined under

clause 99(b) that the market price of the shares of BCFP had been affected by an
anticipated take-over bid, thus giving rise to consideration of whether a follow-up
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would not reside with AEC, but with a control group composed of
AEC and two American corporations holding together a block of
about forty-one percent of BCFP's outstanding common shares. The
evidence indicated that the principal shareholders had always acted
collectively, without having any voting or other agreements, to
nominate and have elected one-half of the total number of directors
of BCFP, and that this arrangement would continue. Moreover, the
management of BCFP and the Minister of Forests for British
Columbia required that AEC and the American controllers enter into
a standstill agreement with BCFP, under which they agreed not to
change their pro rata interests for a period of ten years. It was the
evidence of BCFP, and the view of the minister, that AEC would
not acquire control of BCFP when it completed its purchase of the
Noranda block. The OSC granted the requested exemption from the
follow-up offer obligation on the condition that AEC consent to a
section 124 order, denying AEC the exemptions from the take-over
bid requirements of the act with respect to BCFP. Thus, in the event
of a change in the position of the government of British Columbia or
in the event that BCFP's management permitted AEC to increase its
holdings in BCFP, such an increase would be effected only in
Ontario, in compliance with the take-over bid requirements of the
act, including a follow-up offer to BCFP's Ontario shareholders. It
is difficult, however, to see how the obligation to comply with the
take-over bid requirements of the act could accrue at an
undetermined date in the future.
In Re Dataline Inc., 1 83 an employee fund and retirement plan
acquired a thirty-four percent block of Dataline Inc. in a single
transaction, under circumstances that required a follow-up offer or
an exempting order. A block of over fifty percent of Dataline shares
was held by a holding company which was owned by the president
and chief executive officer of Dataline; thus, he had the power to
control the affairs of Dataline and to elect a majority of its directors.
This majority shareholder arranged for the sale of the other block,
representing thirty-four percent of the Dataline shares, to the fund
and the plan. The purchasers acquiring the block submitted that they
were passive investors with no interest in management or
representation on the board. The majority of the OSC decided that
the fund and the plan acquired no power or authority to control
offer was required to be made by AEC. See Re British Columbia Forest Products
Limited(1981), I O.S.C.B. 116C.
183. Supra, note 181.
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Dataline through the purchase, as the power and control remained
where it had been prior to the private agreement purchase - that is,
with the majority shareholder. In a dissent, the chairman held that a
thirty-four percent holding of the voting securities carried with it an
element of "power or authority to control" the company, since it in
effect gave the fund and plan, as a matter of corporate law, veto
power over fundamental changes in the corporation.' 8 4 Although
such veto power can affect the affairs of a company, we believe that
the most reasonable interpretation to be placed on clause 99(a) in the
context of this situation would be that effective control means the
ability to elect the board of directors. Furthermore, the former
chairman argued that consideration of clause 99(a) required
consideration of clause 99(e), and that the public interest demanded,
in a case where the thirty-four percent had been sold to the plan and
fund through the intermediation of the fifty-one percent controller,
8 5
leaving a small public float, that the application be declined. 1
In Ronalds-Federated,186 Newsco Investments Limited tried to
argue under clause 99(a) that, since Newsco exercised control over
F.P. Publications Limited (FP) equally with four other shareholders
and since FP controlled Ronalds-Federated Limited (Ronalds), the
purchase from FP by Newsco of the Ronalds shares did not
constitute the acquisition of control of Ronalds. Newsco had been
one of five shareholders that each held about 23 percent of the
shares of FP, and FP owned 51.6 percent of Ronalds. Newsco sold
its 23-percent interest in FP to Thomson Newspapers Limited and
purchased FP's 51.6-percent interest in Ronalds. The commission
interpreted clause 99(a) directly with reference to Policy 3-41,
indicating that it would look to whether the agreement had led to the
acquisition of the practical authority to nominate a majority of the
directors. The commission held that Newsco did acquire control of
Ronalds through its direct holding of 5 1.6 percent of the common
shares of Ronalds, as opposed to its indirect control, which amount
to about 11.6 percent of Ronalds through a 23-percent shareholding
of a corporation owning 5 1.6 percent of Ronalds.
In McLaughlin, 187 the commission refused an application, under
clauses 99(a) and (e), wherein the offeror increased its sharehold184. Ibid, at pp. 52C-54C.

185.
186.
187.
98C,

Ibid, at pp. 52C-53C.
Supra, note 165.
Re McLaughlin and S.B. McLaughlin Associates Ltd. (1981),
(1981), 14 B.L.R. 46.

1 O.S.C.B.
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ings in a corporation which was already effectively controlled by
him. McLaughlin owned 49.6 percent of the shares of S.B.
McLaughlin Associates Ltd. on a fully diluted basis. He purchased
additional shares from two other shareholders by private agreement
in order to bring his total holdings to 54.3 percent, again on a fully
diluted basis. The price paid for the shares under the private
agreement was such that a follow-up offer was required.
McLaughlin adduced no evidence as to the reason for paying a
premium over the market price for the shares acquired by private
agreement, and gave no reason why the requested exemption should
be granted, arguing simply that he did not acquire through the
purchase the power or authority to control the business or affairs of
the offeree company, since he already had effective control. It was
submitted that the policy resulting in the enactment of section 91
was premised upon the acquisition of effective control at a
88
premium.'1
The commission rejected McLaughlin's submissions regarding
the policy of the legislation and stated that take-over bids are not
restricted to control bids, pointing out that "section 91(1) extends to
all take-over bids regardless of whether the offeror is seeking
control or already has control." 18 9 After describing the evolution of
securities legislation leading up to the follow-up offer and after
analyzing the provisions of the act, the commission stated that the
thrust of the act was towards evenhanded treatment among security
holders of the same class. 190 The Divisional Court upheld the
decision of the OSC as to the exercise of its discretion to refuse to
grant McLaughlin an exemption, and stated that ". . .one of the
objects of the Act is the protection of minority shareholders. In our
view, that protection may well be as much needed where the
take-over bidder has already acquired control as it is where he is
acquiring control through the take-over bid." 191
The Interim Take-Over Bid Review Report analyzed the effect of
McLaughlin in the context of the legislative history of the follow-up
offer obligation, and concluded that it was not appropriate to impose
a follow-up offer obligation where a transaction solely involved a
188. Supra, note 187, B.L.R. at pp. 52-53.
189. Ibid, at p.53.

190. Ibid, at p. 61.
191. Re McLaughlin and Ontario Securities Commission ( 1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d)

256 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at p. 258 (leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal denied on
November 16, 1981). See also note 223, infra.
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consolidation of a pre-existing control position.1 92 The Review
Committee argued that the follow-up offer obligation was not
designed as, nor should it be converted into, a remedy to cure
perceived insider trading abuses by controlling persons. The
committee recommended that the follow-up offer obligation be
triggered only by an acquisition of effective control and that
effective control be defined, for the purposes of subsection 91(1), as
being "the power to exercise a controlling influence over the
business and affairs of the offeree company.' 1 93 Accordingly, the
Review Committee would argue that the ability to influence the
direction of the management and policy of a company is not
enhanced when a holder of effective control increases his
shareholdings, and, in these circumstances, no follow-up offer
obligation should be required.
The Review Committee supported its position by stating that the
OSC has provided protection for minority shareholders in the
context of insider bids and going private or similar transactions
through Policy 3-37 and related policy initiatives where it has
imposed requirements for a valuation and independent or
unaffiliated shareholder approval. In other circumstances, such as
amalgamations where there is no going private element, the
committee submitted that corporate laws and related jurisprudence
have been effective in protecting minority shareholders' rights
through adequate disclosure in information circulars and the
obligation to demonstrate fairness, by statutory dissenting shareholders' appraisals rights, by the determination of fair value by the
94
courts, and by injunctive relief. 1
The central issue discussed by the Review Committee was
whether or not the purchase or sale of control should be a necessary
prerequisite to the follow-up offer obligation. The implicit
assumption of the take-over bid threshhold is that the acquisition of
a twenty-percent holding involves the acquisition of effective
control. 19 5 In our view, where an application for an exemption is
made under clause 99(a), the act should, as a legal matter, be
192. Interim Take-Over Bid Review Report, supra, note 16 at pp. 214A and
226A.

193. Ibid, at p. 226A.
194. Ibid, at p. 227A.
195. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466. subpara. 1(1)1 l(iii) (twenty percent is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deemed to affect materially the control
of the issuer).
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interpreted as requiring a follow-up offer only where control, de
facto or legal, is actually being acquired, unless the application for
the exemption reveals special circumstances which lead the
commission to reach the conclusion that the result of granting the
exemption order would be oppressive to the minority shareholders.
(d) Equivalent Consideration.Form and Value
Once it is established that a follow-up offer obligation exists under
the act, an offeror must offer "a consideration per security at least
equal in value to the greatest consideration paid" under one or more
of the prior private agreements entered into by the offeror. 196 The
offeror is thus required to first value the private agreement
consideration; then the follow-up consideration must be at least
equal in value to the private agreement consideration.
(i) The Private Agreement Consideration
The Allowable Premium. When a purchaser makes a take-over bid
by private agreement, the seller of shares is allowed only up to a
fifteen-percent premium; otherwise, a follow-up offer obligation on
the part of the purchaser is created.1 97 The OSC has stated that any
premium above the fifteen-percent level, no matter how minimal, is
an unacceptable premium, and that the size of a premium over the
fifteen-percent level is not a governing factor in determining the
fairness to minority shareholders in granting an exemption from the
follow-up requirement. In Ronalds-Federated,the OSC rejected the
argument that a clause 99(e) exemption should be granted because
of the "insignificant amount" of the excess premium: ". . .once
one pays a price that exceeds the market price, regardless of how
small that excess is, a follow-up offer is required . . . . to
concentrate on the size of the premium paid once the price paid
exceeds the defined market price as being the most relevant factor in
seeking an exemption is to start from the wrong premise. Once an
excess premium is paid a follow-up offer is mandated. "198
The fifteen-percent premium threshhold is an arbitrary figure, but
with fairness to the policy-makers, the line had to be drawn at some
point and fifteen percent appears to be a reasonable figure. The
196. Supra, text accompanying note 94.
197. Supra, note 95.
198. Re Ronalds-Federated Limited, supra, note 165 at p. 311. See also. for
example. Re Atco Limited, supra, note 117 at p. 419.
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Review Committee has suggested that the required distribution to
shareholders in a follow-up offer should perhaps be the portion of
the premium in excess of fifteen-percent in order to give recognition
to the fact that a fifteen-percent premium has been deemed
acceptable by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, and that a
sharing of the premium was necessary only to the extent that the
premium exceeded the amount which the Lieutenant Governor in
Council allowed. 19 9
Brokerage Fees or Commissions: In calculating the "market
price", the OSC has decided that the "reasonable brokerage fees or
other commissions" permitted by subsection 91(1) should be
included only where such brokerage fees or commissions are
actually paid. Where no fees or commissions are paid as part of the
private agreement, there should not be a notional calculation of
what such fees would have been if the transaction had taken place
20 0
on the stock exchange.
Cash or Securities: Where the private agreement effecting the
take-over bid is a cash transaction, there does not appear to be any
dispute as to the value of the private agreement consideration; the
value of the private agreement consideration will be equal to the
face value of the cash amount paid. Where securities have formed
part or all of the consideration in the private agreement, it would
appear that the relevant date, under subsection 9 1(1) of the act, for
determining the value of the private agreement consideration is the
date of the private agreement. In addition, the value of such
securities would be the market price, if any, as of the date of the
private agreement, assuming that normal market trading conditions
prevailed as of such date. Where the private agreement consideration paid by the offeror consists in whole or in part of securities
which were originally acquired by the offeror at a cost in excess of
the market price of those securities at the date of the private
agreement, additional complications arise. This situation arose in
the Atco 2 0 1 and Dome Energy Limited2 0 2 cases, which suggest that,
where a large block of securities is involved and the block has been
recently acquired, the best evidence of the market value of the
securities paid under the private agreement in normal circumstances
199. See "Interim Take-Over Bid Review Report", supra, note 16 at p. 235A.
200. See, for example, Ronalds-Federated, supra, note 165, pp. 307-308; Re Sklar
Manufacturing Limited (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 120C at p. 123C.
201. Supra, note 117.
202. Sapra, note 94.
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is the cost of such securities to the offeror, rather than the closing
price of such securities at the date of the private agreement.
Market Price: The commission has the power to make a
discretionary determination of the market price, pursuant to clause
99(b) of the act, to ensure that collateral agreements do not have the
effect of offering certain holders a consideration of greater value
than other holders and to ensure that the market price has not been
affected by rumours of an anticipated take-over bid or improper
manipulation. 20 3 In making a determination under clause 99(b) that
the market price of securities was affected by an anticipated
take-over bid or by improper manipulation, the OSC has stated the
purpose of the clause as follows: ". . .to ensure that when there has
been a disposition of securities at a premium the determination of
whether or not that premium exceeds the 'market price' will be
made in a comparison of a representative base so that minority
security holders will not have been intentionally deprived of their
rateable share of the control premium." 20 4 The OSC also indicated
that it would exercise caution when making determinations under
clause 99(b): ". . .[t]he Commission will be cautious when
exercising its discretion under section 99(b) to make a determination
of 'market price' that is different from that calculated in accordance
with [Reg. s. 163] in a situation where a vendor (or purchaser) may
have been lured into a false sense of security, i.e., that the published
market prices reflect the auction market's perception of the actual
20 5
exchange market value of the subject security."
The commission also has the power to make determinations under
subsection 91(3) and clause 99(d) of the act as to whether collateral
agreements or arrangements result in a security holder receiving
greater consideration than other security holders. The commission
must make two determinations: first, whether an offeree indirectly
received a consideration for his securities through the collateral
agreements of a greater value than that received by the other
shareholders, and second, whether such agreements were made for
reasons other than to increase the value to be paid to the shareholder
203. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, subs. 91(3), clauses 99(d) and (b).
204. Re British Columbia Forest Products Limited ( 1981), 1 0.S.C.B. I16C at p.
120C; (the commission found that the trading price of the BCFP shares on the TSE
was affected by an anticipated take-over bid, and therefore set the market price at a
figure which would have required a follow-up offer). An exemption was ultimately
granted: Re British Columbia Forest Products Limited (Part 1i), supra, note 182.
205. Re British Columbia Forest Products Limited, supra, note 204 at p. 120C.
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by the offeror. A question may arise as to whether factors personal
to offerees, such as income tax benefits, should be taken into
account in determining the value to be attributed to the private
agreement consideration. The plain meaning of the language in
subsection 91(1) referring to "the greatest consideration paid"
arguably supports the proposition that such personal factors should
not be taken into account, since the use of the word "paid", rather
than the word "received", seems to reflect a recognition that an
objective standard must be used to determine the value of the private
agreement consideration.
In Re Royal Trustco Limited, 20 6 the commission did find that a
collateral agreement had the effect of offering a party to a private
agreement a consideration greater than that offered to the other
shareholders. The agreement through which the Royal Trustco
Limited shares of Unicorp Financial Corporation were obtained by
Campeau Corporation permitted an alternative whereby Unicorp
would have a right of conversion, as well as other benefits under a
shareholders agreement, not available to other shareholders. The
commission also alluded to the fact that Unicorp was seeking a
tax-free roll-over of its shares into Campeau shares which would not
be available to other shareholders.
In the Labatt and Dominion Dairies case, 20 7 John Labatt Limited
acquired, by a private agreement, the shares of Dominion Dairies
Limited held by Dart & Kraft, Inc. and it acquired further shares of
Dominion Dairies by a second private agreement. Labatt then
proposed to make a take-over bid for all of the remaining Dominion
Dairies shares, offering the shareholders the same consideration that
had been paid under the private agreements. Labatt had also entered
into collateral agreements with Dart for a trademark licensing
agreement and for a computer services agreement by which
Dominion Dairies would continue to have the right to use
trademarks owned by Dart and to receive computer services that had
been provided by Dart. The commission determined that these
collateral agreements "were bargained at arm's length between the
parties as an essential element of a continuing commercial
relationship between [the offeree corporation and the selling
majority shareholder]", and were made for reasons other than to
206. [1980]O.S.C.B.465.
207. Re John Labatt Limited and Dominion Dairies Limited (1981), 2 O.S.C.B.
IC; Order(1981), 1 0.S.C.B. 189B.
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increase the value of the consideration to be paid to Dart for its
20 8
Dominion Dairies shares.
(ii) The Follow-Up Consideration
Value: The second step in determining whether an offeror has
satisfied the equivalent consideration requirement is to determine
the value of the follow-up consideration. As in the case of private
agreement consideration, where a cash follow-up offer is made, the
value of the follow-up consideration would be the amount of cash
offered per share. Where, however, all or part of the follow-up
consideration consists of securities, the determination of the value
of the follow-up consideration is more complicated.
In considering applications for exemptions from the requirements
of subsection 91(3), namely, that all holders of the same class of
securities be offered the "same consideration" on a take-over bid,
the OSC has dealt with the question of equivalency of cash and
noncash consideration. In the Torstar20 9 case, Torstar Corporation
proposed to offer $30 cash per share to nonresident Canadian
Harlequin Enterprises Limited shareholders. For every three
Harlequin shares, it tendered $60 cash, one Torstar warrant, and
one Torstar preference share to Canadian resident Harlequin
shareholders, so as to avoid conflict with Canadian ownership
constraints contained in Torstar's articles and to avoid registration
of the securities with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The OSC held that "same" consideration, within the meaning
of subsection 91(3), means "identical" consideration. 2 10 The
commission did not make a specific finding that the two offers were
of equivalent value and, indeed, noted that "the package offered
would have different attractions, positive or negative, to each
offeree. ' ' 21 ' The commission did, however, give considerable
weight to the opinions of the investment advisors who testified that
the offers were equivalent in value, and the commission made it
clear that the value was to be the market value at the time of the
212
offer, subject to market variations.
208. Ibid, at pp. 4C and 190B.
209. Re Torstar Corporation, and Harlequin Enterprises Limited (1981), 1
O.S.C.B. 62C;Order(1981), 1O.S.C.B. 113B.
210. Ibid, at p. 65C. Accord, Re Trans Mountain PipelineCompany Ltd. (1983), 5
O.S.C.B. 5C at p. 5C.
211. Supra, note 209 at p. 70C.
212. Ibid, at pp. 70C and 7IC.
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The facts of the Labatt2 13 case are similar to those of Torstar.
Labatt offered Canadian shareholders the option of Labatt common
shares or cash, and offered non-Canadian shareholders cash only.
The commission determined that unequal consideration was
proposed to be offered, since, based on the market prices, the value
of Labatt shares offered was greater than the cash being offered to
non-Canadian shareholders. The commission appears to have held
that the relevant value of the securities offered was the market value
of such securities at the time of the initiation of the take-over bid.
In Turbo, 2 14 the commission held that, where securities are
offered, they are to be valued at their market price on the day that
the follow-up offer is made; the commission explicitly rejected the
submission that "value" should be regarded as "net asset value",
rather than market price, saying that:
In order that equality in value between the consideration paid on
the take-over bid and the consideration offered in the Offer may
be assessed in this case, where the consideration paid in the
take-over bid was paid in actual dollars, the value of the
consideration offered in the Offer, not being paid in dollars, must
be expressed in dollars. The Commission can come to no other
conclusion in the present case but that the conversion of the value
of the securities into dollars can only be effected by determining
what the market price of those securities would be at the date of
the Offer. In the present case, the price paid for the shares
acquiredfor cash in the course of the take-over bid and the value
of the securities offered in the Offer must be susceptible to direct
comparison. In this case, only the market price that would be
paid for the follow-up offer securities, the Bankeno Units, can
2 15
determine their value.
The commission confirmed this decision in an amended offer
hearing, where it rejected the weighted analysis approach which
would combine asset and market value elements to arrive at a value.
It held that ". . .the 'value' of the consideration under the
follow-up offer. . .must be determined by the 'market price' of that
consideration (or, where, as in the present case, there is no
established market, the best approximation of what that 'market
price, would be). Section 91(1) and the terms of Turbo's
213. Supra, note 207.
214. See, supra, note 140.
215. Re Turbo Resources Limited (1982), 3 O.S.C.B. 67C at p. 85C. Southey J.
stated in (1982), 137 D.L.R., supra, note 140 at pp. 273-274, that: "We are in
complete agreement with this application and interpretation of s.91(l) of the
Securities Act. . by the commission".
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undertaking both require that a comparison be made between the
'value' of the consideration offered in each of two transactions,
namely, the take-over bid and the follow-up offer." ' 21 6 The
commission's decision to apply only market value was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Ontario, 2 17 and was confirmed by the
commission in the Sklar 21 8 case, where the commission adopted the
reasoning in its decision on the amended Turbo offer.
Economic Factors and Equivalency: In a notice issued in 1981,
the OSC stated that it would take into consideration "the variation,
if any, in (i) the value of the consideration paid under the private
agreement, and (ii) the value of the consideration proposed to be
offered under the follow-up offer, resulting from the operation of
economic factors between the date of the private agreement and the
date of the follow-up offer". 2 19 The commission's authority to
invoke "economic factors", including the time value of money, is
not apparent, based on the plain meaning of the language in
subsection 91(1) and clause 99(c) of the act. It is reasonable to argue
that such factors should not be considered, so long as the follow-up
offer is made within the 180-day period specifically provided for in
the act. On the other hand, it may be conceded that, if the follow-up
offer is not made within the 180-day period, it would be fair to add
some consideration to reflect the value of consideration from the
date of the expiry of the 180-day period.
In Re Ziebart Corporation,220 the commission expressly required
an offeror to reflect the time value of money to satisfy the equivalent
consideration requirement of subsection 91(1) of the act. In that
case, the commission permitted the offeror to defer its follow-up
offer beyond the 180-day period, pending the resolution of certain
outstanding issues, on the condition that the offeror make a cash
follow-up offer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid under
the private agreement, plus interest, as defined in the Judicature
Act. 22 ' The interest was to be paid on the purchase price from the
date the follow-up offer obligation came into effect under the act that is, 180 days from the date of the private agreement to the date
216. Re Turbo Resources Limited (1982), 3 0.S. C. B. 104C at p. I16C.
217. (1982) 137 D.L.R. (3d) 264(Ont. Div. Ct.),(1982), 19B.L.R. 309.
218. Re Sklar ManufacturingLimited (1982), 30.S.C.B. 120C, at p. 130C.
219. Notice "Re: Take-Over Bids Value of Consideration in Follow-Up
Offers" (1981), 20.S.C.B. 23A.
220. (1981), I O.S.C.B. 5B.
221. R.S.O. 1980, c.223, as am.
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that the securities would first be taken up under the deferred
follow-up offer. The commission also required account to be taken
of the time value of the consideration, under clause 99(c), in the
CanadaPermanent222 case.
In McLaughlin, 22 3 the question of economic factors was
considered by Boland J., who stated that:
On March 15, 1981 [the 180th day after the private agreement
transaction], the right to an offer for $12.24 per share crystallized
and shareholders who wished to accept an offer were denied the
possibility and in effect had been denied the use of the proceeds
since that date.
It is reasonable to assume that such shareholders would probably
have reinvested the proceeds and realized some return. This
should be taken into account when considering the appropriate
value for the proposed offer. Other factors such as inflation, tax
implications, numerous fluctuations in the market and in interest
rates over the past year, and the circumstances of the case in
question are also matters which could be considered 224when
deciding upon the appropriate value of the follow-up offer.
The question of the time value of money and other economic factors
were not addressed in the decisions of the Divisional Court or the
Court of Appeal, and Madame Justice Boland's statements on this
22 5
matter were not expressly overruled or otherwise varied.
It appears that the OSC has only considered economic factors that
relate to the time value of money from the date the follow-up offer
obligation comes into effect until the date the actual follow-up offer
is made. It is not apparent what other economic factors, if any, the
OSC would apply. Logically, one would assume that changes in the
value of the target corporation during this period should also be
taken into account. Thus, if an offeror uses its common shares to
buy shares from a private agreement vendor at a time when its
222. Re Canada PermanentMortgage Corporation(1981), 2 0. S.C.B. 85B. First

City Financial Corporation Ltd. had not at the time determined the date or precise
terms of the follow-up offer it was required to make. See also Re Turbo Resources
Limited (1982), O.S.C.B. 67C at pp. 85C - 86C (first valuation hearing).
223. Ontario Securities Commission v. McLaughlin (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 405

(Ont. C.A.); revg., in part, (1982), 38 O.R. (2d) 390 (Div. Ct.), (1982), 137
D.L.R. (3d) 613, (1982), 18 B.L.R. 241; affg. (1981), 35 O.R. (2d) It (H.C.J.),

(1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 632, (1981),
pursuant to s. 122 of the act upheld).

16 B.L.R. 82 (compliance order issued

224. Ontario Securities Commission v. McLaughlin (1982),

(Div.Ct.) at p. 14.
225. See, supra, note 223.

35 OR. (2d) 11
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shares are trading at $12 per share and if, at the time of the
follow-up offer, its shares are trading at $24 per share, one would
assume that, subject to the trading value of such shares being
affected by the market in light of the pending take-over bid, only
half as many shares would be required to satisfy the follow-up
obligation. Conversely, twice as many shares would be needed if
the value went from $12 to $6. As a practical matter, the market for
the shares of a target corporation will likely be affected by the
obligation to make a follow-up offer, so there may be little, if any,
drop in the trading price of the shares of the target in the usual case.
However, if there is a drop in the value of both the offeror and the
target during the period, then it would appear unfair to require only
the offeror and its shareholders to be at risk.
(iii) To Whom the Offer is Made
Where the follow-up offer is made within the specified 180-day
period following the date of the first agreement, it appears that no
problem would arise regarding to whom the offer should be made:
the offer would be made to the shareholders who held shares at the
time the offer was made within the 180-day period. Where the offer
is not made within the 180-day period and the offeror makes a
voluntary offer or is ordered to do so subsequent to the expiration of
the 180-day period, a question arises as to whether the offer is to be
made to the shareholders at the time the offer is made or whether it
should be made to the shareholders as at the expiration of the
180-day period.
In Turbo, 226 the Ontario Divisional Court upheld the compliance
order, granted by Mr. Justice Osler, which required that Turbo
provide to the shareholders, at the time the follow-up offer is made,
the equivalent follow-up offer consideration as paid under the stock
exchange bid. In McLaughlin, however, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that those entitled to receive the follow-up offer are the
security holders whose last registered address is in Ontario on the
expiration of the 180-day period:
. . .[T]he section is clear: the only persons entitled to receive the
follow-up offer are those who meet the two conditions precedent
on the day the follow-up offer is made, if made before the
expiration of the 180-day period, and if not made within that
time, then those who meet the two conditions precedent on the
226. Supra, note 140.
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day when the 180-day period ends. At that time the class is
closed. Of importance, this meaning is the only one which is
consistent with the words of s. 129.

. . which

provides liability to

the security holders for failure to make the follow-up offer
required by s.91(1).
The offeror cannot change the class by failing to make the offer
within the time directed by the statute, whether the failure is the
result of a decision to seek advantages from market change or
otherwise. Nor has the Court any discretion in the matter. The
scheme of the Act is simply that the follow-up offer must be
made to those who are qualified at a specified time, and the Court
may at the suit of the 2Commission
direct that which should have
27
been done to be done.
Thus, the court held that if a security holder sold his securities
before the offer was, in fact, made at a price below that at which the
follow-up offer should have been made, he could claim under s. 129
for his loss, together with damages.
We believe that the interpretation of the statue by the Ontario
Court of Appeal is correct, but that the act should be amended to
state that the offer should be made to shareholders holding shares on
the date such offer is made, so that the right to receive the offer
would follow the shares in order to recognize the realities of the
marketplace. The McLaughlin case raises the question of whether
shareholders who sell their shares before the offer is made would
have to repurchase shares to tender to the offer or whether they
could simply be entitled to accept the difference between the
follow-up consideration and the price for which they sold their
shares. It would certainly be complicated and unreasonable for
shareholders to have to repurchase shares, thus incurring additional
brokerage costs, in order to tender to the follow-up offer.
(e) Liabilityfor Breach of the Follow-Up Offer Obligation
Section 129 of the act, 22 8 which has not been the subject of judicial
determination, provides that an offeror who fails to make a
follow-up offer at an equivalent consideration or to take up
securities duly deposited under a follow-up offer is liable to pay the
minimum consideration required under subsection 91(1) or the
amount of the excess of the minimum consideration at which the
227. Ontario Securities Commission v. McLaughlin (1983), 40 0.R. (2d) 405
(Ont. C.A.) at p. 409.
228. Supra, text accompanying note 101.
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offer is required to be made under subsection 9 1(1) over the value of
the consideration actually offered, and is also liable for any
damages. The act does not, however, indicate whether the offeror
would be entitled to receive the securities in respect of which the
follow-up offer obligation originally existed. Presumably, a court
would order the transfer of the shares to the offeror who has been
held liable under s. 129, since to not do so would result in an
unjustifiable enrichment by the offeree at the expense of the offeror
and because any prejudice caused by the offeror's failure to comply
with the act could be compensated for by awarding damages.
In McLaughlin, it was argued that the court should not make an
order under s. 122 requiring compliance, because liability for failure
to meet the requirements of subsection 91(1) is specifically provided
for in section 129 by way of a personal remedy to the security
holder. It was contended that the act should be interpreted as
excluding the application of the general enforcement section,
namely, s. 122, in the absence of clear language in the act that the
general provision should apply in addition to the specific remedy
under s. 129. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating
that: ". . .s. 129 is not intended to be an exclusive remedy. It is part
of a scheme to ensure that there is a follow-up offer, and to secure
the benefits which should be enjoyed by those entitled to receive
it. "229 The fact that the general compliance remedy can apply,
notwithstanding the specific remedy in the act, is important,
particularly in the context of the requirement for a follow-up offer
on the basis of an undertaking, as in the Turbo case. Section 129
requires as a condition that an offer must be required to be made by
subsection 91(1), and it is arguable that there is no subsection 91(1)
requirement where there is a mere undertaking. In Turbo, therefore,
s. 129 might not be available to Merland minority shareholders. The
validity of s. 122, notwithstanding that it is a general enforcement
provision, whereas s. 129 is a specific enforcement remedy,
becomes crucial to shareholders who might not have had a remedy
under s. 129, due to there being no subsection 91(1) obligation, but,
rather, an undertaking being enforced by the commission.
VI. Conclusions and Suggestionsfor Reform
It is perhaps unfortunate that the initial Ontario experience with the
follow-up offer obligation was gained in the midst of a very deep
229. Supra, note 227 at p. 9.
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and prolonged recession. Economic conditions created strains
which made the survival of this shareholder equal treatment
experiment doubtful.
Securities markets are not confined within provincial boundaries.
The Ontario experience with the follow-up offer obligation has
demonstrated the importance in a federal system of achieving some
agreement among the provinces for a uniform approach to the
problem of the sale of control. In our view, it is not feasible or
desirable, in the current environment, for the problem to be dealt
with through securities regulation by the federal government. It
would be helpful, however, if the federal government were to revise
the take-over bid provisions contained in Part XIX of the CBCA to
provide for an equal treatment rule for control premiums when the
target corporation is subject to the CBCA on the same model as
adopted by the provinces.
One must then ask whether the Ontario follow-up offer obligation
should continue as the equal treatment rule or whether it should be
revised. We make the following observations:
1. We think that the most important aspect of this matter is
agreement among the provinces and the federal government with
respect to CBCA target corporations regarding the form of equal
treatment legislation to deal with the control premium problem.
Since securities markets are not confined to provincial boundaries, a
uniform approach to the problem is perhaps more important than the
actual legislative technique used to deal with the matter. If a
particular province should decide, as a matter of public policy, that
it is not prepared to legislate equal treatment for control premiums,
then that province would have to recognize that the legislation in
other provinces would, for the most part, regulate control premium
transactions except those within that province which were primarily
local in nature.
2. We have concluded that the preferable approach is that
employed by Quebec, whereby the private agreement exemption is
removed so that take-over bids have to be pro rata. 230 In general

230. The SEC Tender Offer Committee would require a tender offer to be made at
the 20% threshhold level regardless of whether or not a premium for control was
involved. Subject to whatever discretionary exemptive power might be retained by
the SEC, there would be no exemption for stock exchange or private agreement
purchases. See, supra, note 3.
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terms, we would deal with the matter by revising the Ontario
follow-up offer obligation as follows:
(a) The private agreement exemption should be removed except
where the premium paid on the take-over bid is less than a
specified amount. The specified amount could be fifteen percent,
which is the amount of the premium currently applicable to
trigger a follow-up offer obligation. In the alternative, the
amount could be higher. If one approaches the problem from the
perspective that it is only substantial premiums which should be
prohibited by legislation, then it would be possible to justify a
considerably higher premium as the cutoff point. Additionally, if
one were concerned about unduly impeding take-over bids, it
might be possible to justify a considerably higher premium before
the private agreement exemption is removed.
(b) The exemption from the follow-up offer obligation for stock
23
exchange take-over bids should continue. '
(c) Should the private agreement exemption be removed for all
take-over bids or only those where control, de facto or legal, is
actually being acquired? If one were of the view that the mischief
related to the premium for control, then the exemption should
arguably be removed only where control is acquired. Since it is
difficult to determine whether control will in fact be acquired,
however, we would be inclined to maintain the twenty-percent
threshhold, but make it clear that, in the absence of unusual
circumstances, the commission should exempt the transaction.
The commission should permit the private agreement exemption
to be expanded where it is satisfied that control is not, in fact,
being acquired and the premium is not, in fact, being paid for
control or as part of a plan to move towards control.
(d) The situation where the offeror already has de facto or legal
control so that it cannot be said that he is acquiring control is one
that causes some difficulty from a policy point of view. Where
the offeror does not own or control at least two-thirds of the votes
so as to be able to cause fundamental corporate changes to take
place it cannot be said in normal circumstances that he completely
231. See the text following note 148, supra. The exemption for normal course
purchases on a stock exchange at the rate of 5% of the outstanding shares every 30
days is too broad an exemption and should be narrowed to more closely
circumscribe the potential for creeping take-over bids.
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controls the corporation. To a lesser extent the same can be said
when any minority exists because of the remedies available to
minorities as a matter of law for breach of fiduciary duty,
oppression or otherwise. On balance we are inclined to the view
that the private agreement exemption should be available for
further purchases once the offeror holds two-thirds or more of the
voting shares.
(e) With respect to the jurisdictional nexus for the application of
the equal treatment law, consideration might be given to making
a bid subject to Ontario law where the offeree corporation is a
reporting issuer in Ontario. We believe, however, that the current
approach in Ontario, and that adopted by Quebec, namely, of a
bid being subject to the act where an offer is made to a resident
within the province, should be maintained, as it is perhaps the
soundest approach from a constitutional point of view.
(f) The commission should have the power to exempt transactions on the condition that a follow-up offer of the same amount
or equivalent value will, in fact, be made on such terms and
conditions as are satisfactory to the commission.
(g) The unconditional exempting power of the commission
should be continued, but should be granted only in extraordinary
cases.
(h) The possibility of exempting orders where an offeror offers a
topping-up should be recognized. It might even be desirable to
legislate this exemption, although the provisions for the
commission to determine the real premium, where the market has
been affected by an anticipated take-over bid or by improper
manipulation, and for it to determine the effect of collateral
agreements or arrangements would have to be continued.
(i) A question arises as to whether the obligation of the offeror to
minority shareholders should relate to the entire premium or
merely to the portion of the premium in excess of the permitted
premium. In our view, once the specified premium is exceeded,
the private agreement exemption would be removed. It should
still be possible, however, for the commission to grant an
exemption in appropriate cases, conditional on a topping-up for
the entire premium or only for the portion of the premium in
excess of the specified amount.
(j) A question remains as to how nonvoting or restricted voting,

168 The Dalhousie Law Journal

but participating, shares should be treated. We concur with the
views of the TSE, which has stated the following: "It would be
harmful to the credibility of the trading markets for control to
change hands at a premium under a sale of one class of residual
equity shares, probably held by a restricted group of holders,
when no bid is made for publicly distributed residual equity
shares with lesser (or no) voting rights. The real questions lie in
what should be done to meet the situation." 232 The premium
relates to control and, therefore, should perhaps logically apply
only to voting shares. Perhaps, as a matter of corporate law, there
should be limits on the creation of nonvoting participating shares.
Alternatively, provision should perhaps be made to ensure the
inclusion of nonvoting residual equity shares when a take-over
bid is made for the full voting shares.
(k) The legislation, with respect to collateral agreements in
clause 99(d) and subsection 91(3), should be amended to make it
explicit that the standard should be an objective one and that
factors personal to offerees should not be considered in a
determination of whether a collateral agreement has had the
effect of increasing the consideration paid to an offeree.
(1)We suggest that section 99 of the act be amended so that it
explicitly gives the OSC power to bring on an application of its
own accord, since the current language of an "interested person
or company" would seem to exclude the Director under the act
from taking the initiative.

232. The Toronto Stock Exchange Submission to the Ontario Securities
Commission Concerning the Regulation of Non-Voting, Multiple Voting and
Restricted Voting Common Shares (September 1981) p. 16; TSE Notice to
Members No. 3560, April 14, 1982, "Re: The Toronto Stock Exchange's Policy
Statement on Restricted Shares", Appendix A, p. 1.

